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Is Money the Root of all Evil (Prosperity), or is the Lack of Money (Poverty) the Root of all Evil
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~ The numerical data and estimates used in this paper is mainly taken from the International Monetary Fund’s World Economic Outlook in October (there are many other sources which includes data obtained when I was working as an intern in CIMB’s Economic Research Department). Due to the difficulty in inserting graphs, and charts in this form of media, I have decided to omit them completely. However, I would be more than willing to supply the softcopy to individuals who are interested in obtaining it.
Abstract
In the last four years, the world economy has been growing at a rate unmatched since the 1970s. Coupled with low inflation, and high capital inflows into emerging and developing countries, the world economy never seemed better. In line with that, the Malaysian economy has grown rapidly together with the world economy. However, the implosion of the sub-prime mortgage crisis currently threatens to derail the global financial system and put a stop to the rapid world economic growth.
The current situation in the global financial markets provides a challenging avenue to which the Malaysian financial system and economy would be stress-tested by negative external forces. This paper attempts to outline what are the implications of the global financial crisis on the Malaysian economy and financial system. Among some of the areas that would be brought to light, includes Malaysian trade links with advanced economies, financial and bank lending channels, and also any direct exposure of Malaysian financial institutions of U.S. subprime assets.
Literature Review
The autumn of 2008 signals the end of an era. After the implosion of the subprime mortgage crisis in 2007, five of America’s largest investment banks have either disappeared by acquisitions or have been reborn as commercial banks. The reality in the financial markets have brought to light not only the weaknesses in cross-border banking but also seriously wounded the faith of many academicians, economists, and governments in financial globalization and capitalism.
The collapse of the banking system in Iceland, the fall of Fortis (a Belgo-Dutch Bank), and Lehman Brothers all can be explained by the intricate and complex web that ties the fates of multiple countries together of that with the economy and financial markets of the United States of America. Amidst the financial turmoil and partial nationalization of financial firms, Malaysia’s financial system appears to be resilient.
However, as the world heads towards a global recession, Malaysia would not be left off the hook. The research that would be done by our team would aim not only to address the implications of the US financial crisis on the Malaysian economy but more importantly the implications of the global financial crisis on our banking and finance industry and structure. More precisely, we will delve into the role played by the government of the United States, de-regulation, cross-border banking, competition, monetary policy, and securitization in fostering the current financial crisis.
To achieve this purpose, our research would mainly be based on secondary data obtained from the International Monetary Fund (IMF). Do take note that the data we obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook is in October and some of the economic variables might have changed since then as the macroeconomic variables in many countries have taken a turn some for the better and some for the worse. Furthermore, due to IMF data taken in October, these data are subject to the similar assumptions.
First, commodity and oil prices at the time were expected to move in a downward trend, thereby relieving inflationary pressures. Second, the U.S. housing prices and activity is likely to hit the bottom in 2009 and a gradual period of recovery is expected. Third, credit is expected to remain tight as financial intermediation slows due to concerns over capital and assets valuations.
Besides that, our group has also conducted a survey to measure the awareness of Malaysian citizens on how the global financial crisis is affecting Malaysia and their personal standard of living. The survey is aimed at individuals aged 20 and above due to the increased awareness and understanding among people above that age level. To further augment our findings, we conducted brief interviews with various local and international banks to have an overall picture of how the global financial crisis is affecting them.
I. The Current Global Financial and Economic Condition
The world continues to be in a state of shock as the world economy faces a severe downturn as a result of the financial crisis happening in the United States that has now spilled into most of the other advanced and developing economies. The financial crisis in the United States erupted as a result of the collapse of the subprime mortgage market in the United States in 2007. While the economic impact is more evident in developed countries of the Western hemisphere, emerging markets are beginning to be affected as their economic growth begins to slow. Inflation continues to be a concern even though the prices of commodities and economic activity deteriorates worldwide.

Figure1 shows that the global economy has been booming for four years from 2004 to the summer of 2007. In this period, Global GDP rose at an average of approximately 5% a year, which is the highest sustained rate of world GDP growth since the early 1970s (IMF, 2008). This period of high global economic growth is coupled with a relatively low and contained rate of inflation. After the implosion of the sub-prime mortgage market in the summer of 2007, most of the advanced economies are already in or heading into recession.
|
Growth % |
2008 (e) |
2009 (f) |
2010-2013 (f) |
|
ASIA |
|||
|
China |
10.0 |
9.3 |
8.5 |
|
Hong Kong |
4.7 |
5.0 |
5.3 |
|
India |
7.7 |
8.1 |
8.5 |
|
Indonesia |
5.9 |
5.9 |
6.0 |
|
Japan |
1.3 |
1.6 |
1.7 |
|
Malaysia |
5.5 |
5.7 |
5.6 |
|
Singapore |
5.1 |
5.6 |
5.3 |
|
South Korea |
4.5 |
4.8 |
4.5 |
|
Taiwan |
4.1 |
4.5 |
4.3 |
|
Thailand |
4.7 |
5.0 |
4.7 |
|
Philippines |
5.3 |
5.4 |
5.8 |
|
NORTH AMERICA |
|||
|
US |
1.3* |
1.9 |
2.7 |
|
Canada |
1.3 |
2.2 |
2.6 |
|
EUROPE |
|||
|
Euro zone |
1.5# |
1.7 |
2.0 |
|
Britain |
1.7 |
1.6 |
2.2 |
|
AUSTRALASIA |
2.9 |
2.9 |
3.5 |
* This after Q4’s sluggish 0.6% and before Q1’s 0.9%
# Germany has “surprising” 1.5% Q1 growth
Note: Global growth forecasts for 2008 have been trimmed to a still healthy 2.8%. BUT, 2009 growth has been upgraded to 3.1%
Source: Conscensus Economics (London) as at June 2, 2008 and May 15, 2008 (for the long-term forecasts) cited by Elaine Ang & Leong H.Y., 2008. Growth in selected bourses overseas. The Star, 23Jun. B12.
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Earlier this year, there were two prevailing opinions by local economists on the world economy. The first was that the economic activity of the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) would be able to sustain world economic growth and that the emerging and developing economies would be decoupling from the advanced economies. Table 1 shows the forecast earlier this year of Asian economies. Data obtained in June implies that even if the US is in recession, Asian economies would continue to be robust. Most of the Asian economies are seen to be moderately affected in 2008 and continuing an upward growth trend after 2010.
The second widespread believe was that the spike in oil and basic commodity prices due to supply shocks would result in a global stagflation whereby global recession would be accompanied together with a period of high inflation. However, recent data on the world economic condition shows that both opinions are unlikely to be correct as economic growth in emerging and developing countries are affected while commodity prices have on average fallen from their peaks in recent months. This is an assumption base on average aggregate economic data as different regions; the Middle East for example is headed for a period of economic slowdown and high inflation.

Data obtained from the IMF’s World Economic Outlook in October shows that the emerging and developing economies are more severely affected than anticipated. Even countries of emerging Asia which many economists had hope would sustain world economic growth is seen to be very much adversely effected by a slowdown of economic activity in the advanced economies. Figure3 shows the drastic slowdown in G7 countries of which have been heavily affected after a full blown financial crisis in the United States in 2007.

The advanced economies grew at a collective annualized rate of only 1% during the period from the fourth quarter of 2007 through the second quarter of 2008 (IMF, 2008) dropping 2.5% since the third quarter of 2007. The drop in economic growth of advanced economies mainly stem from the correction in housing prices and tightening credit conditions that have resulted in a contraction of economic activity. Both business sentiments and consumer confidence indicators for the United States and the euro area are currently close to the low levels experienced during the 2001-2002 recession.
Credit growth in the nonfinancial corporate sector and households are now slowing visibly in the United States and Western Europe. This implies that the massive liquidity provisions by central banks of developed nations are used to strengthen capital positions of financial institutions instead of rechanneling these funds into the economy. This is a great source of concern as it implies that the real economy of the US would be slowing down dramatically as financial institutions adopt tighter credit lending policies in an effort to recapitalize.

Figure4 clearly shows that the many countries in Asia are adversely affected by the US financial crisis. The newly industrialized Asian economies are heavily affected by the US mainly because the advanced economies remain their biggest trading partners. Furthermore, countries like Hong Kong and Singapore are world financial centers with heavy exposures to US assets and its financial industry. China on the other hand exports a huge proportion of its manufactured products to the United States and other European countries.

Further evidence also shows that the emerging and developing economies would not be fully decoupled from the advanced economies. Figure5 shows us that although developing Asian countries have grown at a breakneck speed in recent years, the United States still contributes around 21.3% of world GDP. Just the contribution of the United States and the Euro Area amounts to around 37% of world GDP. The advanced economies also hold around 51% of the total exports of goods and services. Yet the advanced economies accounts for only 15.2% of the world population. This means that although the advanced economies are only a small part of the world in terms of population, they relatively contribute to a huge portion of world output and trade.

Inflation in emerging and developing countries spiked in 2008 due to the high prices of oil and basic commodities. While both the prices of oil and basic commodities has reached record high levels as a result of supply shocks and increasing demand, price levels are expected to drop in 2009 as a result of many countries entering recession. In advanced countries, real wage flexibility, well-anchored inflation expectations and the threat of economic slowdown have helped to mitigate the rise in price levels. The same cannot be said for emerging and developing economies that have seen real wages fall dramatically as a direct effect from rapidly increasing price levels.

Yet as the global financial system continues to deteriorate, inflation is seen to be less of a threat to global economic stability. Figure 6 shows is that inflation rates are likely to fall in 2009 as a result of a global slowdown in economic activity.
A. The Causes and Effects of the Sub-prime Mortgage Crisis on the Global Financial System
The global financial crisis that stemmed from the collapse in the US Sub-prime mortgage market has evolved into a credit crisis that has caused a disruption to financial institutions in the United States and Europe. Many financial institutions in advanced economies are now deprived of what would normally be a stable and safe source of financing in the interbank market. As a result of this, solvency concerns about financial institutions have affected the fluidity of the financial markets and threaten a systemic meltdown in the global financial system.
The global financial crisis happened in three waves. The first being the implosion of the subprime mortgage market in the United States that led to the collapse of Northern Rock and Countrywide. The second wave occurred around April 2008 when the Federal Reserve engineered the emergency sale of 85-year old investment bank Bear Stearn and the third and most recent wave saw the global financial markets plunged into turmoil as Lehman Brothers (another major US investment bank) went bankrupt. A few days later, the markets faced another shock through the merger of Merrill Lynch & Co. and the nationalization of American International Group, A.I.G. which was the world’s largest insurance company.
Following the third wave, the interbank market froze as banks feared lending to each other due to the collapse in counterparty confidence and worries over bank solvency. Short periods of market stabilization occurred in between these three waves mostly as a result of government intervention in bailing out financial institutions and extending deposit insurance in the United States and a number of European countries. However, equity prices worldwide have fallen sharply as market confidence continues to be absent due to the turbulence and financial stress faced by the financial markets around the world. Evidence of this could be found by a closer look at government securities that represent a default free instrument or safe haven to investors during times of financial uncertainty. Data obtained through the IMF’s World Economic Outlook, October 2008 confirms this with US Treasury bill yields hovering close to zero that signals a very high demand of government backed securities.
It is a widespread believes that securitization had been the centre of the current crisis by encouraging banks to make ever riskier sub-prime loans and later remove them from the bank’s balance sheet. Structured products like collateralized debt obligations (CDO) gave banks and other financial institutions more flexibility as they could give out risky loans, repackage them, and resell them into the financial markets. This enabled banks like Northern Rock to finance their operations through off-balance sheet activities and high borrowings in the interbank and money markets.
The ability to sever the link between those who scrutinize borrowers and those who would bear losses in the case of defaults fostered a sever moral hazard problem and a lack of accountability (The Economists, February 14, 2008). Furthermore, complex securitized assets that combined assets of different credit risk served to reduce transparency and made comprehending their risk exceedingly hard for investors that were willing to hold them. The amount of securitized loans outstanding rose dramatically from $4 trillion in the 1990s to $28 trillion in 2006 (The Economists, February 14, 2008). According to the same source, in 2007, three fifths of American mortgages and one quarter of consumer debt were securitized.
B. Contagion effect
The adverse effect of the crisis became more serious as financial institutions involved in these sub-prime lending took heavy losses that affected their capital adequacy. Theoretically, banks were able to diversify their risks to other individual and institutional investors by transforming home loans into securities through securitization. However, the risk shifting process did not reduce systematic risk and instead created a more widespread meltdown in the global financial system. Due to frozen interbank markets and a drastic drop in securitized assets, many investment banks, hedge funds and insurance companies had to be rescued by government bailouts throughout the developed countries.
The reality of housing bubble in the US exposed the vulnerability and weaknesses in cross border banking. Most evident was the entire collapse of the banking system in Iceland that ended in the Dutch government’s bailout so that Dutch citizens could withdraw money from Landsbanki. Other concerns include burden-sharing among countries like seen in the dismemberment of Fortis, a Belgo-Dutch bank. Lenders in Europe were also willing to follow the risky practices of their American counterparties which are taking on risky debt and relying on short term loans, rather than deposits to finance their operations. For example, Hypo Real Estate, the Germany’s second largest commercial real estate lender whose loans exceeded its deposit base by more than eight times (Nelson D. Schwartz, 2008).
Following the implosion of US sub-prime mortgage market and the destruction of billions of dollars of capital also led to the nationalisation of Northern Rock which was the first bank run in U.K. in 140 years. Northern Rock was Britain’s fifth-biggest mortgage provider at the height of the housing boom in the US Even though Northern Rock was once the fastest-growing mortgages bank, its failure was due to relying too heavily on the wholesale markets and the securitization of its mortgages for its operations rather than from retail deposits. As a result of this, Northern Rock was low on cash when market liquidity froze. Furthermore, investors shunned away from the mortgage-backed securities and Northern Rock found it hard to liquidate their investment in wholesale market.
After the nationalization of Northern Rock, Wall Street was hit by the collapse of Bear Stearns. According to the Economist (2008), the Bear was the most exposed to the sub-prime mortgage market with positions of up to $10 trillion worth in credit-default and interest-rate swaps. These mortgage-backed securities plunged in market value when the subprime mortgage exploded. As banks and other financial institutions lost confidence in Bear Stearns, billions of dollars were demanded to be withdrawn on short notice. Ultimately, Bear Stearns got into trouble when other banks refused to lend it money as they feared that it had too many bad debts in the sub-prime mortgage crisis.

The collapsed Bear Stearns brought a full-blown credit crunch as concerns about the stability of the financial system continue to deepen. Soon, Lehman Brothers, the fourth largest US investment bank had filed for bankruptcy protection after incurring billions of losses in the US mortgage market. In September 2008, Lehman Brothers had about $113billion bonds outstanding. It was estimated that Lehman Brothers had entered into $1trillion derivatives transactions on behalf of itself and some of its customers. Lehman was involved in highly leveraged investment by using collateral from trading partners as their own collateral to borrow more money to buy highly risky securities such as credit default swaps.
Normally, the derivatives contracts will end immediately when a party filed bankruptcy. But the problem arose when the amount of collateral exceeded the value of agreements (Goldstein M. & Henry D., 2008). Moreover, many hedge funds had their accounts frozen as they placed hundreds of millions of cash and other securities with Lehman’s prime brokerage operation in London (Goldstein M., 2008).
As the crisis entered the third phase, US mortgage giants – Fannie Mae and Freddie Mac were also in need of a government bailout. According to the Economist (2008), Fannie had pre-tax losses of trading assets and “available-for-sales” securities of $4.8 billion while Freddie’s amounted to $15 billion at the end of 2007. Initially the two institutions were set up to provide liquidity for the housing market by buying mortgages from the banks and repackaging them for use as collateral for bonds called mortgage-backed securities. One of the problems with the twins was that they were operating with very tiny capital. The two groups had core capital of $83.2 billion at the end of 2007 and this supported around $5.2 trillion of debt and guarantees, a gearing ratio of 65 to one.
C. Response
Governments across the world are facing a grim challenge to restore the full functionality of the financial system after the effects of US sub-prime crisis transformed into a global financial crisis. Many of the world’s leading investment banks and financial institutions have collapsed and some of them have either merged or nationalized to prevent further adverse consequences to the international financial system. As a result, the US government has proposed a massive bailout and governments across the globe are putting in greater effort to face the worst financial crisis since the Great Depression in 1929.
Variety of measures has been taken by the US government and the Federal Reserve that includes a US$700 billion bailout plan, bank recapitalization, asset purchases, interest rate cuts, capital injections, liquidity and lending guarantees, bank deposit guarantees, and short selling curbs (Financial Times, 2008). The first step in the rescue program is the bailout plan that was approved by the Congress on the 3rd October 2008 with United States secretary of treasury authorized under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 to inject $700 billion into the US financial system (House Committee on Financial Service, 2008)
Throughout the bailout plan, a total amount of $700 billion emergency funds will be injected into US financial system as $250 billion of funds will be allocated to buy over illiquid mortgage backed securities in the form of preferred stock. Half of the $700 billion would be injected into nine big banks and while the other half will be injected into small lenders and thrift institutions (Financial Times, 2008). The capital injections were aimed at reforming the global financial system and restoring liquidity to stabilize US economy and financial system. Apart from the bank recapitalization plan, another $100 billion out of the $700 billion would be used to purchase distressed loan assets from banks. The whole bank rescue plan would then help banks to meet their customer’s demand with additional liquidity provided by treasury.
|
|
|
Loss |
Capital |
|
Worldwide |
|
403.1 |
322.5 |
|
Americas |
|
178 |
158.8 |
|
Europe |
|
203.9 |
147.2 |
|
Asia Citigroup UBS Merrill Lynch HSBC Holdings IKB Deutsche industry |
|
21.9 42.9 38.2 37.1 19.5 16.3 |
16.5 44.1 29.5 17.9 3.5 13.4 |
|
Bank of America |
|
16.0 |
20.7 |
|
Royal Bank of Scotland |
|
15.5 |
24.4 |
|
Morgan Stanley |
|
14.4 |
5.6 |
|
Credit Suisse |
|
9.8 |
1.5 |
|
Washington Mutual |
|
9.3 |
12.1 |
|
JP Morgan Lehman Brothers |
|
9.2 8.2 |
7.8 13.9 |
|
Deusche Bank |
|
7.8 |
3.2 |
|
Wachovia |
|
7.4 |
10.5 |
|
|
|
|
|
Source: Bloomberg, cited from The Star, 2008.Flip-flop in US financial leadership, Starbiz, The Star Newspaper, 4th July 2008, p.B5.
The next tool that the Federal Reserve would use to stimulate the US economy is the cutting of its interest rates. According to Table3, the Federal Reserve had cut rates by half a percentage point to 1.50%. The rationale for lowering interest rates was in order to reduce the impact of the slowdown in economic growth brought by the financial crisis. In addition to that, many of the world’s central banks also lowered their interest rates simultaneously to help to cushion their nation against the global financial turmoil. From the table below, the European Central Bank and four other central banks’ interest rates lowered by half a percentage point respectively.
|
|
NEW RATE (%) |
CHANGE (pts) |
|
|
Acted in Coordination |
|
|
|
|
Bank of Canada |
2.50 |
-0.50 |
|
|
Bank of England |
4.50 |
-0.50 |
|
|
European Central Bank |
3.75 |
-0.50 |
|
|
Swenden’s Riksbank |
4.25 |
-0.50 |
|
|
Swiss National Bank |
2.50 |
-0.50 |
|
|
US Federal Reserve |
1.50 |
-0.50 |
|
|
Acted Alone |
|
|
|
|
Reserve Bank of Australia |
6.00 |
-1.00 |
|
|
Hong Kong Monetary Authority |
2.50 |
-1.00 |
|
|
|
|
|
|
Source: The banks, cited from The Star, 2008. S.Korea, HK and Taiwan also cut rates, Starbiz, The Star Newspaper, 10th October 2008, B8.
Federal Insurance Deposit Corporation (2008) in United States is extending their liquidity or lending guarantees given to financial institutions. All senior debt issued by banks will be given 100% guarantee over the next three years. The newly-issued senior unsecured debt which the government will underwrite including promissory notes, commercial papers, inter-bank funding and non-interest bearing transaction deposits held by FDIC-insured banks. By providing immediate guarantee support into banking industry, confidence level would be bolstering in the turbulence times. To further boosting confidence level, US was ready to increase the deposit guarantee limits from current $100,000 up to $250,000 per depositor through the end of 2009 (Financial Times, 2008). Other European governments are also joined the action taken by FDIC.
One of the causes that triggered financial crisis was to be banned lifted on 8th October. Short selling activities would be temporarily banned in more than 900 financial companies in US (Financial Times, 2008). The US Securities and Exchange Commission (SEC) would prohibit activities on short-sales of financial shares and continue the restrictions on bets against companies’ shares in place. It is to avoid further unhealthy activities by investors and also to avoid any potential market abuses. Legislation would be under revising and stricter rules and greater regulations for financial sector would be imposing while the government progress the $700billion bailout plans.
AIG was brought into trouble when one of its small London unit A.I.G Financial Products sold complex financial contracts or credit derivatives. A.I.G.F.P insured $513billion of debt against default using credit default swaps (CDS) (The New York Times, 2008). The plunged value in US housing market forced AIG goes for nationalization when value of those insured debt was affected. The Federal Reserve created a secured credit facility of up to US$85billion in exchange for warrants for a 79.9 % equity stake and on November 10, 2008, the US Treasury Department announced to purchase $40billion in senior preferred stock from AIG (US Department of the Treasury, 2008). On top of that, AIG’s credit rating being downgraded from AAA to A- on 15th September by Standard & Poor rating agency.
II. Monitoring the Malaysian Economy’s ability to withstand external shocks
A. Economic Growth
According to Roger A. Arnold (2008), the gross domestic product (GDP) refers to the total market value of all final goods and services produced annually within a country’s borders. Based on the expenditure approach in computing GDP, a country’s GDP is the sum of its consumption, investment, government purchases, and net exports. While the GDP is a good measure of the total output capacity of a country, a country’s GDP omits certain underground activities (for example, the selling of illegal DVDs and VCDs), the sale of used goods, and financial transactions. Furthermore, a country’s GDP is only the aggregate total of an economy’s output and it does not represent the equality in income of its citizens.
Prior to the drop in commodity prices worldwide, Malaysian analysts was more concern over the impact of high oil prices rather than the US financial crisis on Malaysia’s GDP growth. The Malaysian Institute of Economic Research was quick to revise its GDP growth forecast upwards to 5.3 % as international commodity prices have retreated from their record high levels coupled with Malaysia’s higher than expected growth in the first half of the year (The Malaysian Insider, 2008). However, the independent research house lowered its GDP forecast to 3.5 % (the slowest pace in eight years) in 2009 amid poor global economic outlook and further predicted that Malaysia could fall in recession by the second or third quarter next year.

This projected forecast of Malaysia’s economic growth is not in line with prevailing economic views earlier this year whereby many economists expected a decoupling of the emerging economies from the advanced economies as the BRIC countries (Brazil, Russia, India, and China) would be able to sustain world economic growth. This view on the global economy is proving to be increasingly inaccurate as the emerging economy powerhouses has taken a hit in GDP growth that is forecasted to continue on a declining trend in 2009. The highly uncertain and volatile global financial condition would strain the Malaysia’s economy growth and it would be challenging for the government to sustain the growth.
B. Current Account
The Malaysian net exports would be more adversely affected from the slowdown in the US economy. Earlier year in 2008, the argument was that the emerging Asian economic powerhouses like China and India would cushion the impact of from a slowdown in developed economies. According to the World Economic Outlook report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2008, there would be a 25 % chance that the global economy would face a recession should growth be 3 % or lower this year and next. A slowdown in developed countries (particularly the United States) would have an adverse effect on Malaysia’s GDP growth as the demand for Malaysian exports decline.
|
Balance of Payments, 2005-2010 |
||||||
|
|
Rm billion |
% to GDP |
||||
|
Item |
2005 |
2007 |
2010 |
2005 |
2007 |
2010 |
|
Balance on goods |
128.9 |
127.7 |
134.1 |
25.9 |
20.3 |
16.0 |
|
Exports |
539.4 |
605.9 |
765.8 |
108.2 |
96.5 |
91.3 |
|
Imports |
410.5 |
478.2 |
631.7 |
82.4 |
76.1 |
75.3 |
|
Balance of services |
-9.6 |
2.4 |
3.8 |
-1.9 |
0.4 |
0.4 |
|
Transportation |
-15.9 |
-13.2 |
-13.5 |
-3.2 |
-2.1 |
-1.6 |
|
Travel |
18.7 |
29.1 |
31.7 |
3.7 |
4.6 |
3.8 |
|
Others |
-12.4 |
-13.6 |
-14.4 |
-2.5 |
-2.2 |
-1.7 |
|
Balance on income |
-24.0 |
-13.8 |
-21.4 |
4.8 |
-2.2 |
-2.6 |
|
Balance on current account |
78.3 |
100.5 |
95.7 |
15.7 |
16.0 |
11.4 |
|
Financial and capital account |
-37.0 |
-37.2 |
- |
-7.4 |
-5.9 |
- |
|
Overall balance of payments |
13.6 |
45.3 |
- |
2.7 |
7.2 |
- |
Notes: As at May 30 2008
Source: Economic Planning Unit and Department of Statistics Malaysia

|
Components of Malaysia’s GDP |
|||
|
% Change |
|
2009² |
|
|
|
|
Original forecast |
Current forecast |
|
Demand |
5.7 (5.0) |
5.4 |
3.5 |
|
Domestic Demand |
6.1 |
6.0 |
5.8 |
|
Private Consumption |
6.8 |
6.5 |
4.9 |
|
Private Investment |
6.2 |
5.8 |
1.9 |
|
Public Consumption |
5.7 |
4.0 |
6.3 |
|
Public Investment |
3.6 |
6.4 |
13.4 |
|
External Sector |
-2.9 |
-2.6 |
-15.3 |
|
Export³ |
4.7 |
4.6 |
-1.5 |
|
Import³
Supply |
5.7 |
5.5 |
0.3
|
|
Agriculture |
3.6 |
3.7 |
2.9 |
|
Mining |
2.8 |
3.4 |
2.3 |
|
Manufacturing |
4.7 |
4.3 |
0.8 |
|
Construction |
4.0 |
3.1 |
3.1 |
|
Services |
7.1 |
6.9 |
5.6 |
|
Estimated ²Forecast ³Goods and Services |
|||
Source: The Star, 2008. Bank Negara governor on the current situation in Malaysia. 15 November 2008.
Emerging economies like Malaysia which is export-intensive (having a current account surplus of RM100.5 billion in 2007) would similarly face an economic slowdown should the demand for exports from developed countries decline. Based on data obtained from Bank Negara Malaysia, the United States is still Malaysia’s biggest export destination and one-third of Malaysia’s exports were accounted to US, Europe and Japan which are likely to slip into recession.
C. Export
According to CIMB Investment Bank Bhd’s head of economic research, Lee Heng Guie, a 1% decline in US GDP growth could potentially trim Malaysia’s export growth by 0.8% percentage points, leading to a 1 percentage point decline in GDP growth (Fintan Ng & Suraj Raj, 2008). Should this be true, an economic slowdown faced in the United States would adversely affect the Malaysian economy through the trade and financial links of between these two countries. Even though Malaysia could exports more to the Asian countries to reduce the impact on export growth, it might not be able to continuously do so over a long period of time. This is because many of the Asian countries that import from Malaysia do not consume the goods they import. On the contrary, many Asian countries repackage and re-export finished goods to the United States.
Year 2000


D. Fiscal Budget
A country’s fiscal budget comprises of government expenditures (the sum of government purchases and government transfer payments) and tax revenues (Roger A. Arnold, 2008). Malaysia has a long standing fiscal deficit (10 years) whereby government expenditures are greater than tax revenues of approximately 3% to 4% of gross domestic product. According to Nor Zahidi Alias (2008), Malaysia has the highest budget deficit as a percentage of GDP within Asean. During this financial crisis, Malaysia’s government would likely implement expansionary fiscal policies. According to Angus Whitley (2008), the Malaysian government would inject RM7billion stimulus package to housing, public transportation and private sectors. Besides that, it also plans to spend around RM200 billion in five years on infrastructures and other development projects in order to bolster domestic demand (Stephanie Phang and Angus Whitley, 2007).
Previously, Malaysia is seen to suffer from a double shock in this crisis. Malaysia is a net exporter of crude oil (unrefined petrol) which according to Petronas, churns out 600,000 barrels per day of which 339,000 barrels per day are refined locally (the balance is exported as crude oil). Government revenue would decrease further as the slowing in global demand caused the commodity prices to decline. As forecasted by MIER in the Malaysian Insiders (2008), Malaysia’s budget deficit this year will exceed 5% of GDP and exceed 4% next year.
The country risk will increase accordingly as the government need to finance the deficit by borrowing. This is supported by Moody’s Investors Service’s A3 rating on Malaysia’s foreign currency long-term debt (the fourth-lowest investment level). The Malaysian rating has not been upgraded since December 2004 (Stephanie Phang and Angus Whitley, 2008).
E. Interest Rate
As a consequence of the adverse global development, Bank Negara Malaysia had practice easy monetary policy by cutting its Overnight Policy Rate (OPR) by 25 basis points to 3.25% as growth risk is increasing against the inflation risk (Angus Whitley, 2008). This is a pre-emptive measure aimed at providing a more accommodative monetary environment. Malaysia needs to cut the borrowing costs and boosting public spending to stimulate growth as the global financial crisis threatens to trigger a global recession. It had made the cost of funds, mortgage and car loans cheaper and thus, may help companies to survive in the economic downturn. However, it is important to bear in mind that depending on domestic spending would not be able to sustain the growth.
Interest rate cutting may create more problems when there is high inflation rate. However, the inflationary pressure is diminishing and expected to be grown at a moderate pace as the decline in global food and commodity prices (BNM, 2008). Furthermore, the domestic price pressures would also be easing as government has lowered domestic fuel prices. Thus, cutting interest rate would be wise to offset some of the effects of the global slowdown. This is because it is costly for a country to go into recession as more business would force to be closed down, default and rise in unemployment.
F. Business Competitiveness and Unemployment
During this crisis, our foreign reserves had shown a declining trend. According to the graph above, the international reserves of Bank Negara Malaysia amounted to RM345.5 billion (equivalent to US$100.2 billion) as at 31 October 2008 and RM343.8 billion (equivalent to US$99.7 billion) as at 14 November 2008. The reserves position is sufficient to finance 8.1 months of retained imports and is 3.7 times the short-term external debt (BNM). The falling position might due to the de-leveraging by many international investment banks that demanded for dollars and also a portion of our foreign reserves that are built up by short-term inflows (The Star, 2008). Figure13 shows us the extent of reduction in Malaysia’s international foreign reserves.

Table9 shows us that the foreign direct investments (FDI) flowing into Malaysia has not reached pre-Asian crisis levels. This is a signal that should Malaysia continue to delay opening up its economy, it is going to lose out against regional economies like Thailand and Singapore because of their own comparative advantages in technology and innovation. In a globalized world, foreign funds flow to countries with the most well managed economy and shun countries which adopt protectionist policies. Therefore, it is important for Malaysia to move up the value chain by forcing local companies to be more competitive in their struggle for survival and profitability.
Foreign Direct Investment

From the figure 14, we can see that the inflows of our foreign direct investments are increasing over the years, but. Yet it is also important to note that although the inflows of foreign funds have been increasing over the years, the outflow of foreign funds has been also increasing. In 2007, we had a net outflow of $2586million which sent a signal that Malaysia economy is lacking of competitiveness to attract foreign investors. Besides political instability, our country is lacking of investment in human capital and technology to further enhance Malaysia’s attractiveness in terms of foreign direct investments.
III. The Performance of the Malaysian Financial System amid a Worldwide Financial Crisis
During the global financial crisis, there has been significant economy slowdown in most developed countries around the world. The situations worsen when it turned out as spiking inflation and recession at the same time in US and most European countries. While experiencing high volatility in global financial system and contagion effects continues to spreading around, Malaysia government is confidence in our banking sector’s outlook. With the report published on October, RAM Ratings (2008) had revised the Malaysian Banking sector’s outlooks from stable to developing in June 2008. Due to this, Malaysia governments and economy analysts are confidently saying that the Malaysian banking system will remain resilience towards these external shocks.
Generally in the decade after the Asian financial crisis in 1997/1998, Malaysian had continually undergone transformations and structural reforms in its banking sector. This had given rise to strong fundamentals in Malaysian banking system. These continuous developments in banking sector have generally insulated Malaysia from being heavily exposed during the time of worldwide financial stress. RAM Ratings (2007) stated its overall rating actions were largely positive throughout year 2007 by which its rating upgrades were from various sectors; almost half were from infrastructure and financial-services sectors.
From table 10, the debt ratings for financial institutions such as CIMB Investment Bank Berhad had upgraded from AA3 (positive) to AA2 (stable) whereby AmBank (M) Berhad and RHB Capital Berhad were upgraded from A2 (stable) to A1 (stable). These upgraded ratings for issuers of debts indicate Malaysia’s corporations and financial institutions are able to maintain their ratings despite there are sub-prime chaos and increased volatility in financial markets in lately years. They are likely to continuing on performance and strengthen in their strong fundamentals.
Private debt securities (“PDS”) market started to develop in the mid-1980s. During the pre-crisis period (1990-1997), the Malaysian economy was driven by foreign direct investments, which financed the capital-intensive industries in the country. The 1997-98 crisis shows the adverse effects of over-reliance on bank loans in financing due to the absence of a well-developed debt market. After the Asian financial crisis, efforts have been made to develop the debt market in particular the capital market.
PDS market experienced an expansion at a compounded annual growth rate of 33.6% between 1981 and 2007 (RAM Ratings, 2007). This high growth in PDS market has enabled large corporations to assess large-scale financing in capital market rather in the loans market itself. As a lesson learnt from the previous crisis, Malaysia had diversified their over reliance of banking system in their economy structure and thus able to minimized the risks of falling out in Malaysia economy if sub-prime issues is likely to be happen in Malaysia.
Besides that, financial disintermediation had allowed Malaysia banking structure changed into a more diversified base in terms of lending. Since financial disintermediation had lowers a bank’s credit risk in servicing a large single borrower, domestic banks have to move their attention to retail lending and fee-based income. As such, financial disintermediation has created a cost advantage or profit maximization opportunity and which has resulted in a change in a bank’s balance sheet items and composition of its total loans. Consequently banks in Malaysia will less likely get affected by sub-prime issues.
While financial disintermediation creates opportunities, it comes along with potential threats when those securitized loans in US mortgage market had been the main cause for US financial crisis in 2008. Thus, it would impose greater credit risks in Malaysian banking system if those big corporations create sub-prime lending through the growing PDS market. Cagamas Berhad was incorporated as a special purpose vehicle in Malaysia with the main activity of securitizing domestic banks’ loans into Cagamas debt securities. As an implication from US financial crisis, unregulated and over-booming sub-prime markets are in their ability to bring down the world financial centre. US Financial crisis incident should alert the Malaysian government to put greater attention in governing Cagamas and securitization activities.
Furthermore, Malaysia’s banking system is not much affected by the financial crisis because Malaysia’s banking sector is well capitalized, heavily regulated and not directly exposed to US sub-prime mortgage securities. The international reserves in Malaysia amounted to RM343.8 billion (equivalent to US$99.7 billion) as at 14 November 2008 (BNM, 2008). Since the crisis in 1997/1998, Malaysia nations have learnt the importance in building up foreign exchange reserves as a hedge against attacks. 10 years after Malaysia’s recovery, Malaysia has now a healthy stash of international reserves.
Besides a healthy volume of international reserves, BNM (2008) as at October announced that the net interbank placements from the banking system amounted to RM198.5 billion. Liquidity in Malaysian banking system stays at healthy levels readily available to be pumped into the banking industry when need arises should the overall economy continue to weaken continuously. With adequate capital that was accumulated after the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia’s banking system is likely to remain positively strong to cushion against any adverse external shocks.
One of the most heavily regulated industries in Malaysia is the banking sector. With supervised control and a well regulated financial system formed by Bank Negara Malaysia (BNM), Malaysia’s banking system is likely to be able to weather the worldwide financial stress systematically. Furthermore, the central bank requires foreign banks to be incorporated domestically. The requirement for Malaysian branches of foreign banks to be incorporated as local subsidiaries have partially isolated domestic incorporated foreign banks from being affected by their parent’s banks that are suffering from the global financial crisis.
American international Assurance Bhd (AIA) was incorporated in Malaysia since 1948 under American International Group Inc (AIG) (Daljit Dhesi, 2008). The recent involvement of AIG in issuing CDS had caused AIG to undergo a nationalization program. AIA is not impacted by their parent company because it is locally incorporated with adequate and high level of working capital. Meanwhile, Bank Negara is closely monitoring the banking and insurance industry to maintain the soundness of our financial system. This is to ensure that foreign financial institutions are well support in their domestic operations and able to cushion against financial losses independently.
Although strong fundamentals have in many ways shielded the Malaysian financial industry, the banking sector is inevitably likely to be affected up to certain level. The marked-to-market and impairment losses that are arising from fixed-income-securities will affect the local banks’ book values when they are engaging in the capital markets for financing (Promod Dass, 2008). When interest rate shoots up for compensation of the higher business risk level in turmoil times, the value of the securities may drop. As a result, the fair value accounting applied in banking system will cause the credit ratings of financial institutions to deteriorate.
According to the Edge Daily (2008), there is a lower banking system deposits in October. The total deposits with the banking system declined RM8.7 billion compared to an increase of RM9.1 billion in September. The withdrawals of short-term money market funds were mostly by domestic non-bank financial institutions which in the form of demand deposits and repos. This was to reduce and avoid investment activities in the current unfavorable money market situation.
Besides, RAM Ratings also had conducted a survey on the impact of the slower economy growth on banks’ loan growth, asset quality and profitability between June and September 2008. The result was there has been stable loan applications over the three months period. In October, gross financing to private sector was at RM57.1 billion where there is a slight decreased from September (RM60.8 billion) (Promod Dass, 2008). Although loans application remains stable to reflect the outlook of lending business is in favorable condition, loans growth will get affected because banks are likely to be more cautious in their lending. While potential borrowers’ creditability generally would be dampen by the worsen economy situation in the future, most banks will practice more stringent rules in their loans approval process.
Consequently, loan approval for consumer and hire purchase loans would be decreasing while business loans are depending on which sector borrowers from. Loans to oil and gas industries will still experience at a growth rate but retail, manufacturing and construction sectors will be affected and are currently facing a contraction because of the global economic slowdown that has an adverse effect on local exports. Consumers, small and medium enterprises and businesses will face difficulty in getting loans which in turn could slow down asset growth and impede the interest income sources for banks. Profitability for banks is squeezing and the banking industry may underperform.
As a solution to help out in this worsening situation, the central bank has reduced the Overnight Policy Rates (OPR) by 25 basis points on 24th November to 3.25%. The interest rates cut were aimed at stimulating the local economy. However, doing so would come with a cost of lowering a bank’s interest earning. In order to offset the decline in bank earnings, BNM also announced the reduction of the statutory reserve requirement (SRR) to 3.5% from 4% with effect from December 1 at the same time (Yap Leng Kuen, 2008).
The further cut in the statutory reserve requirement is aimed to increase the funds available for lending and investment purposes. By lowering OPR and SRR requirements at the same time, banks are able to maintain or improve their deteriorating profitability which was affected by the financial crisis. With a cut of SRR by 50 basis points, BNM is expected to release RM2.7 billion into Malaysian banking system. The additional liquidity into banking system can stimulate economic growth by adding additional money supply into the economy.
On the other hand, as at end-September the net non-performing-loan (NPL) ratios have declined to 2.4% from 2.5% of total net loans. Likewise, the asset quality in the banking system which is measured by the NPL ratio is expected to increase in a small percentage over the next 6 to 12 month but likely to remain stable in 2010 (Cecelia Kok, 2008). The potential of increase in bad loans would most probably lead to loan losses from retail, manufacturing and construction sectors and maybe in unsecured personal loans and credit cards.
When economy comes under inflationary pressures and is experiencing a slowdown in economy, it is a rational to expect that bad loans will increase since borrowers’ repayment ability will be deteriorated as a result of tightens spending power. As a result, expected bank’s provision for loan losses needs to be increase. Consequently, banks need to effectively managing their funds available for loans to quality borrowers in order to ensure their profitability did not eroded where the funds are limited.
Generally, a loan will be categorized as non-performing or bad when they default on payment for more than three months. The measurement of NPL ratios as an indicator for banking system outlook would not be that appropriate. Default in derivatives contract was not taking into consideration for NPL ratio. When foreign banks or institutional investors underwrite their mortgage-backed securities, it generally would not be taking into consideration for NPL ratios. Furthermore, it will be itemize as off-balance-sheet in a bank’s book. The risks associated with those derivative contracts only appear when it comes into default. Thus, even if the banks are holding a lot of high risk derivatives products, they will not subjected to any cushion of capital or being subjected for ratings purpose.
To prevent further impact that might arise from the global financial stress, BNM had announced a pre-emptive way to preserve consumers’ confidence level in banking sector and maintained banking system stability. Effective from 16 October all ringgit and foreign currency deposits would be under fully guaranteed by government through Perbadanan Insurans Deposit Malaysia (PIDM) (BNM, 2008). This additional guarantee was work on a temporary basis until it reaches 31 December 2010. At the same time, BNM also would guarantee interbank obligations of banking institutions of banking institutions and will provide sufficient capital for banking institutions when there is a failing in maintaining capital adequacy at a target level.
IV. Survey Interpretation
As the global economy slowdown has posted a threat to Malaysia, we have conducted a survey to measure the awareness of the public on the current financial situation in Malaysia. This survey is built upon a total of 80 respondents that range from age 20 to 50 years old which have been divided into equal number according to their age groups.
According to the survey, we discovered that 100% of respondents were aware of the global financial crisis that is happening in the world right now. In addition to that, 100% of respondents also think that this global financial crisis which originated from the United States has affected Malaysia. This is because the effect of the crisis had spread throughout the world and many of the countries are starting to experience a slowdown in their economy which Malaysia is no exception.
While commodity prices have been falling recently, a general broad based economic slowdown is unavoidable and thus has posted an impact on consumers spending. Generally we believed that consumers are likely to cut down on their spending because of the pessimistic economic outlook in 2009. Next, we will examine the impacts of the crisis towards our nation’s economy activities.
The third question in survey is to identify which area has the greatest impact on our country as a result of the global financial crisis. As shown in the pie chart below, 45% of 80 respondents think that the area that had the most impact from the crisis is economic growth. Employment is the second highest answer with 20 respondents having selected it although this is the main concern of most of the young adults. Malaysia’s economic fundamentals are the main importance in most respondents’ views.

After experienced a worldwide slowdown in economic activity, 60% of our respondents which were amounted to 48 respondents are in view of our country is in an economic recession after the global financial crisis. This may be due to the fact that the overall slowdown in our economy such as export competitiveness as mentioned in the findings of Malaysia’s economy. Furthermore, also examine how the current economic condition in our country has affected their household consumption. 66.25% (53 respondents) are with the opinion that their household consumption has been affected.
In addition to the 53 respondents, 21 of them stated that they were cutting down their miscellaneous goods and services. Another 12 of the respondents stated that they would reduced their clothing and footwear. Moreover, 7 of the respondents will save on foods and non-alcoholic beverages while another 6 of the respondents will save on their transportation. Furthermore, 5 respondents stated they will cut down on their housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, and the last 2 respondents of them (for the respondents that in their twenties) will save on health.
Up next, the bar chart below shows the greatest first and second concern as a Malaysian. By far, the job security and concerns on the economy out-weighs the other relevant concern as around 31 and 22 respondents respectively choose these them as their main concern. As said, economic growth seems to be Malaysian’s concern when in such a turbulence time. More importantly, people are conscious about their future perspective in employment because an economic slowdown will cause more unemployment that would ultimately deteriorate Malaysia nations’ earnings of which their standard of living will be affected at the end. Other popular concerns are in personal welfare, increasing fuel and utilities prices, political stability. The second concern was the economy and job security concern which stood at the first and second place in the figure 3.
In times of financial instability, people will start to reduce their spending. From the survey, 28% respondents have reduced their spending on luxury goods and 25% of them have cut down on their debts. 18% will reduce their investment activities, 10% would reduce on travelling, 8% would be a reduction in savings and 11% in others. The results indicate that consumers will most likely cut spending on inelastic items such as luxury goods and travelling plan.
Although housing market in Malaysia are not heavily affected by the global financial crisis, we have examined that consumer responses to the falling home prices from the cut down in interest rates. 65% respondents have no desire to invest their money in property sector. They would rather put their extra money into savings (44%), shares (27%), unit trust (17%) and 12% in others. This is likely because people generally would feel more secured holding their money in high liquidity investments.
The next graph shows that generally our respondents have a medium level of confidence on the Malaysian banking system. After experienced such an economy slowdown brought by the crisis, most of the people have a lower confident level towards the Malaysian banking system because of the unforeseeable future in the world banking system after the crisis spread to a global scale. Furthermore, our respondents were relatively on the fence on whether Malaysian can better handle its banking system as compared to U.S.
Lastly, we examine the need the government bailout plan in rescuing those government-linked companies as well as those important financial institutions who have involved in the crisis. 70% respondents are agreeing to a bailout plan (should there be a need of one). 35% suggested to increased subsidies on important essential household items, 31.25% wish there would be higher government spending in the private sector to boost the economy, 21.25% supported the market to recover by itself and 12.5% emphasis in capital control.
V. Interview Results
To further strengthen our findings in banking industry impacted from the worldwide economy slowdown, we have arranged a few informal interview session with some banks representatives. From the conversations we have, most of the financial institutions in Malaysia have been practicing costs cutting in recent days. For example, C bank will cancel its annual dinner this year. This is a pre-emptive way to be more secured in a worsening economy outlook that is more likely to happen next year.
Even though there is no massive retrenchment in the financial sector, we realised that many of the banks would not continue to renew their contract staffs upon their contract expiry and there are also no headcount replacement when any of the staffs resign. This might imply that the remaining staffs will need to work on a multi-tasking purpose when the banks are trying to cut down the duplicated works.
Besides that, some of the banks had proposed to transfer their staffs to more profitable departments. For example, the O bank will transfer its staffs from mortgage department to direct sales department. This is because it found that the demand for mortgage loans would be lesser for this turbulent time as compared to the previous booming economy. The bank also wants to reduce its risk towards the housing sector and the mortgage loan will take longer time to recover its profits as compared to personal loans and credit card loans.
Furthermore, the staff we interviewed from the U bank also said that the bank is proposing to sell off its share margins unit. This might due to the volatility of current share market which would make it to be less profitable. Moreover, many banks are tend to be more strict in their over time claims such as they must provide reasonable reason in order to claim their over time. For example, C bank staffs need to work for three hours to get their meal allowance as compared to two hours previously. Also, many of the staffs we interviewed expressed their anxiety towards their year-end bonus.
In conclusion, this cost cutting could be justified as a precautionary way to response to the crisis in order to be more secure in the future.
VI. Findings
In the previous chapters, we have seen that after years of strong economic growth, the world economy is facing a major slowdown in growth as the financial crisis that originated from the US Sub-prime mortgage crisis evolved into a full-blown world financial crisis. As many of the advanced economies are plunging into recession while emerging economies face weaker economic growth, it would be rational and prudent to say that the emerging economies especially those in Asia have not decoupled from the economies of advanced nations.
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On the surface, the Malaysian banking system appears to be relatively resilient in comparison with the banking system in the countries that are more ‘open’ and less regulated. In comparison with the Asian financial crisis which occurred around 10 years ago, it seems that the Malaysian government and financial industry had learnt its lesson by being less exposed to external shocks and adopting more stringent credit standards. Furthermore, the financial institutions in Malaysia are not directly holding to sub-prime related assets compared to the newly industrialized economies like Singapore and Hong Kong.
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The resilience of the Malaysian financial system is indeed a boon to Malaysia in what many economists has stated as the greatest financial crisis since that of the Great Depression in the 1930s. However, the outlook of the economy in terms of GDP growth shows that Malaysia is not completely insulated from the grim happenings in the United States. This suggests that although the local financial system remains relatively strong, other factors have transmitted the adverse effects of the US financial crisis into the Malaysian real economy.
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As Malaysia is not fully relying on foreign capital to fund its growth, capital flight would not have so adversely affected the local economy as it did in the Asian financial crisis. Instead, the trade links between Malaysia and the advanced economies, in particular the Unites States which still remains as Malaysia’s largest trading partner seems to be the culprit. As commodity prices like crude oil and palm oil have fallen from their peaks due to a drastic drop in global demand, the Malaysian government has loss a substantial part of their revenue that would have normally been used to prim and pump the economy.
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Since government spending in sectors like construction would have a multiplier effect on the overall economy, a drop in government revenues would result in lower government spending and a slowdown in economic growth. Should the slowdown in economic growth turn into a long and severe recession, the local banking and financial system would not escape unscathed. This is because a slowdown in economic growth would mean that the Malaysian economy would not be able to sustain the same number of business entities and job creation levels as during times of economic expansion.
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Malaysia Economic Growth Has Not Reached Pre-Asian Financial Crisis Levels

The likelihood of bankruptcies and insolvencies due to a severe recession would raise the risk profiles of local companies and force banks to increase their interest rates and adopt more stringent credit lending policies. However, by increasing the cost of business operations, banks would further increase the likelihood of business failures and start a vicious circle that would ultimately affect the local banking and financial industry. Consequently, the Malaysian economy would move pro-cyclically together with the advanced economies and would likely fall into a recession in 2009.
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Furthermore, although Malaysia’s closed-door economic policies have enabled it to be partially insulated, Malaysia has yet to reach economic growth levels prior to the Asian financial crisis. While other countries, most notably China and India have grown at breakneck speed, Malaysia is seen to be relatively lagging behind. Furthermore, data obtained from the Boston Consulting Group shows us that South-East Asia is facing a lack of companies that can be called ‘world class.’

This hints to us that the price we pay for shielding our local economy from external forces have impacted our local company’s’ competitiveness. Furthermore, out of the five companies highlighted by Boston Consulting Group, most of them are dealing in either food and beverages or commodities.
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VII. Recommendations
A. Focusing on Economic Fundamentals
Ultimately, the Malaysian economy would have to move away from being overly reliant on commodity exports to fuel its economic growth. Malaysia is a net exporter of crude oil which according to Petronas, churns out 600,000 barrels of crude oil per day (of which 339,000 barrels per day are refined locally). Based on projections before the petrol price hike in June, Malaysia’s demand for fuel would exceed local production in 2011. Even though the nation still has oil reserves for another 22 years and gas reserves for 39 years, Malaysia would cease to be a net exporter of oil in the not too distant future.
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Furthermore, overly relying on commodities to fuel economic growth would expose the Malaysian economy to external shocks from international commodity prices that is seen in recent years to be increasingly volatile. A good example of this can be seen in 1997 when Russia at the time had a persistent budget deficit s financed by issuing short-term government securities and printing money (Alan Shapiro, 2005). The combination of rapid debt issuance and falling commodity prices which was a major source of Russia’s revenue caused the Russian government to suspend the trading of treasury bills and a mandatory restructuring of government debt.
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Even if Malaysia had an unlimited supply of natural resources, trickle-down economics would also not be an effective way to efficiently allocate capital to their most productive use. On the contrary, government directed credit would prove to be a distortion in the market as capital is allocated not towards the most profitable and productive industries but into favored sectors of the economy and government cronies. A similar scenario happened during the Asian financial crisis whereby governments directed the banking system to lend massively to companies and industries that was viewed as economically strategic without regard to their profitability.
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These lending decisions that were dictated by what would be commonly known as crony capitalism caused an overinvestment in certain sectors which would lead to artificially inflated asset prices similar to the sub-prime mortgage industry before the summer of 2007. Crony capitalism proved fatal when East Asian countries loss their export competitiveness as a result of the Chinese yuan depreciating about 25% against the dollar (Alan Shapiro, 2005). Crony capitalism, a persistently high budget deficit, and the loss of export competitiveness led to the downfall of many countries during the Asian financial crisis.
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In order to avoid the same mistakes made in the Asian financial crisis, Malaysia should diversify its economy and its exports away from being too reliant its exports of commodities. It would be beneficial to the Malaysian economy should the Government foster policies and regulations to strengthen economic fundamentals instead of aiming to just pump and prim the economy with revenues obtained from commodity exports. Among some of the economic fundamentals essential for economic growth includes labor productivity, sound capital investments, freer trade, property rights, and economic freedom (Roger A. Arnold, 2008).
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B. An Independent Central Bank as a Bulwark against Irresponsible Fiscal Policy
Governments all around the world suffer from the same principle-agent problem that plagues public listed companies. In theory, politicians and government officials are agents that are supposed to work on behalf of the public who are the principals. In reality, this is sometimes not the case. This is evident in the case whereby ex-chairman of the Federal Reserve Paul Volcker used tight monetary policy to combat inflation even when fiscal policy was expansionary.
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One of the main causes of the U.S. subprime mortgage crisis can be traced back to the fact that the Federal Reserve under Alan Greenspan kept interest rates too low for too long. Furthermore, the Bush administration was generous in tax cuts and spent lavishly on the war in Iraq. Coupled together with loose monetary policy, there was too much ‘cheap money’ in the market. All this ‘cheap money’ ended up in the end up in the subprime mortgage market that fostered over inflated asset prices.
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In order to avoid this, central banks must not only be vigilant when times are bad but also maintain monetary discipline when times are good. While it is common to adopt an ‘if it isn’t broke, why fix it,’ it is important to note that periods of overly rapid economic growth usually foster bigger and more severe financial crises in the future.
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C. Improving Malaysia’s Competitiveness
It is a common misperception that countries blessed with natural resources like oil would result in higher economic growth prospects and higher competitiveness compared to countries that are forced to spend large amounts of money to import these resources. Yet as history has often proven to us, this is seldom true and countries with natural resources are often plagued with a resource curse which leads to corruption, wastage, and mismanagement of the economy. Topping the list are countries like Russia and Venezuela that though are rich in natural resources are plagued with economic mismanagement.
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According to the Centre for Public Policy Studies director Tricia Yeoh, natural resources do not necessarily bring greater growth and development to a country. In her paper titled Promoting Revenue Transparency in Malaysia, Tricia takes for example how per capita incomes in resource-deficient countries grew two to three times faster than resource-reliant export-driven countries between 1960 and 1990. According to the International Monetary Fund, a country is resource-reliant of at least 26% of its national revenues derive from extractive industries like oil, gas, and minerals.
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Malaysia is a resource-reliant country with a huge portion of government revenues coming from the oil and gas industry. Similar with most resource-reliant countries like those in the Middle East and Latin America, Malaysia is behind the curve in adopting freer trade, property rights (remember the Boonsom Boonyanit land law case), economic freedom, and privatization of state owned companies. The presence of oil and gas in Malaysia has created and artificial sense of wealth to which the petrol-dollars are used to pump and prim the economy and subsidize a number of essential consumer items.
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On top of that, the Malaysian ringgit used to be pegged to the greenback thus making it undervalued in terms of purchasing power parity to other regional currencies. This has made Malaysian exports cheaper relative to other countries and resulted in a booming export industry and a current account surplus. While the oil price hike in June is detrimental to the Malaysian export industry, it is likely that domestic firms in Malaysia would become more competitive. The reason for this is that as the costs of doing business increase, Malaysian companies would be forced to innovate and generate more income in order to protect their profit margins and ensure their survival.
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Furthermore, the increase in costs would breed an environment to which companies with substandard performance in certain industries are forced to stop operations and change into more profitable industries. A highly competitive environment like this would foster more creative destruction which according to Joseph Schumpeter would revitalize itself by scrapping old and failing businesses and reallocating resources to newer and more productive industries. This is the cornerstone and ultimate advantage that capitalist economies have over centrally planned ones.
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VIII. Conclusion
The world economy and financial system is facing one of the most grim challenges yet seen in the 21st century. As the global financial markets continue to be hit by the adverse effects of the U.S. financial crisis, the credibility and appeal of the Reagan-Thatcher style of capitalism is losing ground. However, this does not mean that closed-door and heavily regulated economies fare any better. In Malaysia’s case, a highly regulated and relatively closed-door economy still faces adverse effects from the global financial turmoil.
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While direct impacts to the local financial institutions have been avoided, the Malaysian economy is not completely insulated from the happenings in other parts of the world. Trade links and various other channels have enabled some of the adverse economic pressures to pass through into the Malaysian economy and financial situation. This implies to us that even though a heavily regulated financial system and closed-door economic policies are unable to completely isolate Malaysia from the world.
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Furthermore, maintaining such policies comes with a cost. Foreign direct investments coming into Malaysia has been increasing on a slower pace. To add to that, Malaysia has yet to achieve pre-1997 economic growth levels. Furthermore, protectionist policies implemented after the Asian financial crisis have made local firms less competitive over the years. In the words of Milton Friedman, “there is no such thing as a free lunch!”
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BNM, 2008. Malaysian Financial System Can Weather Current Global Financial Turmoil. [online]. Aug 10th 2008, Available at: http://www.bnm.gov.my/index.php?ch=8&pg=14&ac=1701 [Assessed 26 November 2008]
BNM, 2008. Monetary and Financial Developments September 2008: Highlights of the Press Release. [online]. Available at: http://www.bnm.gov.my/view.php?dbIndex=0&website_id=1&id=675 [Assessed 26 November 2008]
Cecelia Kok, 2008. Challenging Times Ahead; Banks brace for impact of slower economic growth. The Star Bizweek, 8 November 2008, BW3.
Choong Khuat Hock, 2008. The disappearing Asian trade surplus. StarBiz, 22 December 2008. p.B6.
CIMB Research Report, (2008). Regional Economic Compass 2008: Malaysia. Singapore. Indonesia. Thailand. Hong Kong. Kuala Lumpur: Xpress Multimedia Sdn. Bhd. p.31.
Daljit Dhesi, 2008. AIA: Turmoil in US will not hurt Malaysian ops. [online]. 17 September 2008, Available at: http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/9/17/business/2042807&sec=business [Assessed 29 November 2008]
Daljit Dhesi, 2008. Lower deposit rates. StarBiz, 5 December 2008. p.B3.
Daljit Dhesi, Racheal Kam & Laalitha Hunt, 2008. Banks selective about lending. StarBiz, 10 October 2008. p. B1.
Eileen Hee, 2008. Downward pressure on exports. StarBiz, 3 November 2008. p.B11.
Eileen Ng, 2008. Malaysia to inject $2 billion into economy. [online]. Available at: http://www.businessweek.com/ap/financialnews/D9484F6G1.htm [Assessed 2 December 2008]
Elaine Ang & Leong H.Y.,2008. Growth in selected bourses overseas. The Star, 23Jun. p. B12
Elaine Ang and Leong Hung Yee, 2008. Growth in selected bourses overseas. StarBiz, 23 June 2008. p.B12-13.
Federal Deposit Insurance Corporation, 2008. Temporary Liquidity Guarantee Program. [online]. Available at: http://www.fdic.gov/news/news/press/2008/pr08100b.html [Assessed 13 November 2008]
Financial Times, 2008. Government Interventions. [online]. Available at: http://www.ft.com/cms/s/0/54f2b80e-9947-11dd-9d48-000077b07658,dwp_uuid=698e638e-e39a-11dc-8799-0000779fd2ac.html [Assessed 4 November 2008]
Fintan Ng, 2008. Consumers to tighten belts: Survey. [online]. Available at: http://thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/12/23/business/20081223132010&sec=business [Assessed12 December 2008]
Fintan Ng & Suraj Raj, 2008. Emerging economies still rely on the super powers. StarBiz, 9 June 2008, p.15.
Fintan Ng and Leong H. Y., 2008. Is the world facing another stagflation? [online]. 8 September 2008, Available at: http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/9/8/business/1963411&sec=business [Assessed 24 November 2008]
Fintan Ng and Suraj Raj, 2008. Are we staring at a global recession? StarBiz, 9 June 2008. p.B14-15.
Fintan Ng, 2008. Moderate 4.7% growth in Q3. StarBiz, 29 November 2008. p.B1.
Goldstein M. & Henry D., 2008, A Money Mystery at Lehman, BusinessWeek, Issue 4104, p. 034.
Goldstein M., 2008, Lehman bankruptcy Gets Ugly, available at: http://www.businessweek.com/investing/insights/blog/archives/2008/10/lehman_bankrupt.html [Assessed 7 November 2008]
House Committee on Financial Service, 2008. Emergency Economic Stabilization Act of 2008 [online]. Available at: http://financialservices.house.gov/ESSABill.pdf [Assessed 4 November 2008]
Huang Sin Cheng. The Mortgage-Backed Securities Market in Malaysia. [Online]. Available at: http://www.adb.org/Documents/Books/Mortgage_Backed_Securities_Markets/5_malaysia.pdf [Assessed 12th November 2008]
IMF, 2008. World Economic Outlook, October 2008. [online]. Available at: http://www.imf.org/external/pubs/ft/weo/2008/02/pdf/text.pdf [Assessed 7 November 2008]
Jagdev Singh Sidhu, 2008. Zeti: Malaysia will not slip into recession. StarBiz, 29 November 2008. p.B5.
Joseph Stiglitz, 2008. America’s war-torn economy. The EDGE Malaysia, 14 April 2008. p.62.
Kam Racheal et. al., 2008. Measures to review tax incentives and improve collection. StarBiz, 27 Jun 2008. p.B13.
Kathy Fong, 2008, On Safer Ground. The EDGE Malaysia, 3 November 2008. p. 66.
Laalitha Hunt, 2008. Foreign currency deposits rise as forex rates fall. [online]. 22 November 2008, Available at: http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/11/22/business/2618952&sec=business [Assessed 26 November 2008]
Lee Heng Guie, 2008. CIMB Research Report (Regional) – US spillovers- Asia faces risks of a marked slowdown. 8th October 2008. Issue 115.
Loong Tse Min, 2008. OPR lowered to 3.25%. StarBiz, 25 November 2008. p.B1.
M. Hafidz Mahpar and Racheal Kam, 2008. M’sians bearish on economoy. StarBiz, 7 November 2008. p.B1.
Nelson D. Schwartz, 2008. U.S. Missteps Are Evident, but Europe Is Implicated. [online]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/2008/10/13/business/worldbusiness/13euro.html?_r=1
[Assessed 7 November 2008]
Nor Zahidi Alias, 2008. Alarm Bells Over Deficits. [online]. Available at: http://www.marc.com.my/home//userfiles/file/Alarm%20Bells%20Over%20Deficits.pdf [Assessed 26 November 2008]
Nouriel Roubini, 2008. Anatomy of financial meltdown. The EDGE Malaysia, 3 March 2008. p.62.
PIDM, 2008. Frequetly Asked Questions on Government Deposit Guarantee. [online]. Available at: http://www.pidm.gov.my/_system/media/pdf/events/gov_guarantee_faq.pdf [Assessed 20 November 2008]
Rachael Kam et al., 2008. Current account surplus projected to reach RM 96bil. StarBiz, 27 June 2008. p. 12.
RAM Ratings, 2007. Corporate Default & Ratings Performance study (1992-2007). [online]. August 2008, Available at: http://www.ram.com.my/images/myRam/pdf/RAM_default_2007.pdf [Assessed 20 November 2008]
RAM Ratings, 2008. Commentary Banking Sector: Malaysian banking shores still safe from global financial tidal waves. [online]. October 2008, Available at: http://www.ram.com.my/images/myRam/pdf/CBS_Oct08.pdf [Assessed 20 November 2008]
Shankaran Nambiar, 2008. US economy still has impact on Malaysia. StarBiz, 11 August 2008. p.B6.
Stephanie Phang and Angus Whitley, 2007. Malaysia’s Economy May Expand 6% in 2008, Najib Says. [online]. 20 June 2007. Available at: http://www.bloomberg.com/apps/news?pid=20601068&sid=al6TYh842UUg&refer=economy [Assessed 29 November 2008]
The Economist, 2008. A short history of modern finance: Link by Link. [online]. Oct 16th 2008, Available at: http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12415730 [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Business in South-East Asia: The tigers that lost their roar. [online]. Feb 28th 2008, Available at: http://www.economist.com/world/asia/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10760174 [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Buttonwood: Heart of Glass. [online]. Jan 31st 2008, Available at: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10609325 [Assessed 13 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Credit-rating agencies: Restuctured products. [online]. Feb 7th 2008, Available at: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10655009 [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Cross-Border Banking: Divided we stand. [online]. 16 Oct 2008, Available at: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12436205 [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Echoes of the Depression: 1929 and all that. [online]. Oct 2nd 2008. Available at: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12342273&fsrc=rss [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Economic Focus: Same as it ever was. [online]. Jan 10th 2008. Available at: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10496807 [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Fannie Mae and Freddic Mac: end of illusions. [online]. Jul 17th 2008, Available at: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=11751139 [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Rescuing the banks: But will it work? [online]. Oct 16th 2008, Available at: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12432432 [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Securitisation: Fear and loathing, and a hint of hope. [online]. Feb 14th 2008, Available at: http://www.economist.com/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10689043 [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economist, 2008. Special report- The world economy: Taming the beast. [online]. Oct 9th 2008, Available at: http://www.economist.com/specialreports/displaystory.cfm?story_id=12373748 [Assessed 22 October 2008]
The Economists, 2008. Wall Street crisis. The Economists, 386(8572).
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The Malaysian Insider, 2008. Nor Mohamed: Unemployment at 4 percent or lower. [online]. Available at: http://www.themalaysianinsider.com/index.php/malaysia/12696-nor-mohamed-unemployment-at-4-per-cent-or-lower [Assessed 16 November 2008]
The New York Times, 2008. An Insurance Giant, Brought Down. [online]. Available at: http://www.nytimes.com/imagepages/2008/09/27/business/20080928_MELT_GRAPHIC.html [Assessed 14 November 2008]
The Star, 2008. Bank Negara governor on the current situation in Malaysia. [online]. 15 November 2008, Available at: http://biz.thestar.com.my/bizweek/story.asp?file=/2008/11/15/bizweek/2547475&sec=bizweek [Assessed 26 November 2008]
The Star, 2008. Bank Negara says Malaysian banking system strong. [online]. 15 October 2008, Available at: http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?sec=business&file=/2008/10/15/business/2278625 [Assessed 26 November 2008]
The Star, 2008. Consumer sentiment falls to all-time low, says MIER. StarBiz, 18 July 2008. p.B5.
The Star, 2008. Focus on new sources of growth. StarBiz, 27 June 2008. p.B12-13.
The Star, 2008. Focusing on balance sheets. StarBiz, 17 October 2008. p.B4.
The Star, 2008. Pump Priming the economy. BizWeek, 8 November 2008. p. BW8-11.
The Star, 2008. Senate will try to revive bank rescue bill, Starbiz, The Star Newspaper, 1 October 2008, B8.
The Star, 2008. Slipping foreign reserves? [online]. Available at: http://biz.thestar.com.my/bizweek/story.asp?file=/2008/11/15/bizweek/2544329&sec=bizweek [Assessed 7 November 2008]
U.S Department of the Treasury, 2008. Treasury to invest in AIG restructuring under the Emergency Economic Stabilization Act. [online]. Available at: http://www.ustreas.gov/press/releases/hp1261.htm [Assessed 14 November 2008]
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Yap Leng Kuen & Jagdev Singh Sidhu, 2008. Drop in reserves not a concern. StarBiz, 13 November 2008. p.B1.
Yap Leng Kuen, 2008. Market expects more interest rate cuts. [online]. 26 November 2008, Available at: http://biz.thestar.com.my/news/story.asp?file=/2008/11/26/business/2646655&sec=business [Assessed 29 November 2008]
Yeow Pooi Ling, 2008. Bonds, savings to fund stimulus. StarBiz. 6 November 2008. p.B1.
Roger A. Arnold, 2008, Economics 8th edition, Thomson South-Western, Thomson Corporation, United States of America
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The Price Control Paradox
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Attempts by rulers and governments alike to control the market prices of goods and services goes way back hundreds of years before Christ, at least to the code of laws compiled and enforced by the Babylonian King Hammurabi around 1800 B.C. Other historical records also points out a long list of price ceilings on foods and other products imposed during the reign of Diocletian, emperor of the then already in decline Roman Empire to clamp down on inflationary pressures faced by the state. Ironically, attempts by authorities to impose and enforce price controls have normally backfired in the long run and caused widespread social unrest among citizens subject to them.
A prime example would be during the winter of 1777-1778, when George Washington was beset by many enemies including the British and Hessian mercenaries at Valley Forge and decided to implement price controls to reduce the prices of the commodities needed to supply his army.[1] At that time, the idea of price controls seemed like a life-saving economic instrument to protect Washington’s already impoverished financial coffers from depleting any further. But the price controls had a more complex economical effect and did not work out the way the President wanted. Contrary to it’s intended purpose, the price controls prompted the prices of uncontrolled goods, which were mostly imported, to rise to sky high records.
Robert L. Schuettinger and Eamonn F. Butler (1979) stated that most farmers at Valley Forge who were subjected to price controls refused to sell their produce for what they regarded as an unfair price. Some families who were financially desperate even started selling their food to the more ‘generous’ British who paid them higher prices in gold. When it became clear that the price controls had these unintended effects, George Washington was given a choice to abolish the price controls and pay farmers at the price they were willing to accept or risk starving his army to death. Fortunately, the president was wise enough (for his own sake) to choose the former.
Yet another dramatic example in history was how the downfall of emperors in Russia, Austria-Hungary, and Germany during World War I in 1914 to 1918, could be traced to the implementations of price controls. At the start of hostilities, there was a widespread illusion that countries like Russia which had a large peasant population would provide it with an enormous advantage in food production. In reality however, Russia though possessing a big pool of manpower was poor in aggregate terms and quickly implemented price controls to buy food from farmers at artificially low prices. Unfortunately for the Russian Tsar, farmers subjected to price controls also had an economic weapon of their own: which means seceding from farming.
Consequently, peasant farmers started to refuse selling their produce for unprofitable low returns and the supply of food to urban areas dried up.[2] As the food situation became more severe, urban famine became a widespread issue in Russia and this ultimately led to the Bolshevik Revolution in 1917. In sharp contrast to Russia, the British and American farmers were offered higher prices for their crops and responded normally to incentives by rapidly increasing agriculture production. This gave both the British and the Americans which followed the market system a considerable advantage compared to countries adopting price controls on the agriculture sector.
Equally disastrous but not immediately felt were the wage and price controls adopted by Richard Nixon in 1971. The real reason behind the implementation of these measures was to prevent inflation from harming Nixon’s bid for reelection. Not surprisingly, the price controls worked well in the short-run with inflation tamed and the economy booming in 1972. In the long run however, the price controls acted only to delay the inevitable. When the price controls were removed in 1974, inflation in the United States shot up to an alarming double digit figure of 12 percent![3]
How price controls disrupt the market system
The market system is often characterized by the presence of private ownership of resources and the usage of the market and prices to coordinate and direct economic activity.[4] In a market or capitalist system, individuals and businesses are given a relatively free hand to decide for themselves how they would achieve their economic goals. According to Adam Smith (1776), the operation of a market system creates a curious cooperation between private and public interest. This happens when individuals and businesses that are operating in a highly competitive environment will simultaneously work to promote both public and social interest as though guided by an “invisible hand.”
The implementation of price controls would disrupt the market system by distorting the pricing of the goods and commodities subjected to it. Because price controls is implemented by establishing a price ceiling (maximum price) or price floor (minimum price) on a good or commodity, the market would no longer be able to determine their correct pricing. This means that sellers and buyers would be forced either to trade at a price either above or below their true preference (depending on whether it is a price ceiling or price floor).

A look at Figure 1 and Figure 2 gives us a glimpse of the effects of price controls towards the supply and demand of a certain commodity (all other things held constant). Without price controls, the market price for the commodity in Figure 1 would be at point E, where price is Rm4 for 55 units of the commodity. For the price ceiling to be effective, the ceiling price must be below the equilibrium price of Rm4. But by setting the price at Rm2 for example, the quantity demanded of the commodity will be 75 units at point B whereas the quantity supplied will be only 35 units at point A. In other words, the diagram shows us that the implementation of a price ceiling would result in a shortage of 40 units of the commodity.

In contrast to the diagram in Figure 1, price floors will generate an opposite effect when implemented on the commodity. The market price of the commodity in Figure 2 should be at point E. The implementation of an effective price floor would have to be above the equilibrium price, for example, at Rm6. But with a price floor at Rm6, the quantity demanded of the commodity would only be 35 units at point C compared to the quantity supplied of 75 units at point D. The price floor would therefore at the end the day produce a surplus of the commodity of 40 units.
Generally either a severe shortage or an overabundant surplus is bad for the economy. Instead of giving the “invisible hand” the flexibility of guiding the economy’s resources to the most productive investments, the very “visible hand” of price controls distorts both supply and demand resulting in a wrong market signal to sellers and buyers in the market. This creates a perfect recipe for misallocation of resources.
The other main problems with price controls are in its unenforceability and rigidity. Authorities may be able to put a price ceiling on rice for example, but not on the imported fertilizers needed for rice production. If the cost of fertilizers increase (a situation the world is currently facing), farmers will be caught in a squeeze between a higher cost of production and a stagnant selling price of rice. In the long run as shown above, a persistent shortage develops as more and more farmers leave the agriculture industry in search of other jobs with higher wages.
The perils of price controls do not end here because in an event of persistent increase in cost of production, the true equilibrium price of rice would rise further and further away from the price ceiling. When this happens, it will become more attractive to illegally supply rice through a “black market” rather than selling it legally in markets regulated by price controls. Compounding these adverse effects is that the prices in the illegal markets will most certainly be higher than those in the free market as illegal traders will incorporate a “risk premium” for selling the rice illegally. The end result is that everyone in the market is left at a worst off situation.

A good example of this whole scenario is the recent reported incident of a shortage of government subsidized rice in Kedah, Malaysia. Originally, the controlled price of the local (ST) super grade rice is a between Rm16.50 and Rm17.50 for a 10 Kg packet.[5] Due to the spike in the cost of rice production, the citizens of the state of Kedah face a 15 to 40 percent increase in the prices of rice and also a shortage of government subsidized rice.[6]
Figure 3 is a simple representation of the adverse effects of price ceilings on rice in the long run. Because the price ceiling is set below the market price at point E, investment in rice production will start to decrease as rice becomes a less profitable product relative to other commodities. This will shift the supply curve from S to S1. In an event whereby the price of fertilizers increase, the supply curve will shift further to the left as farmers that caught between the squeeze of low rice selling prices and high production costs continues to reduce production. Adding to that, food items are essentials with their demand being highly inelastic (lack of substitutes). Some consumers would therefore increase their consumption of subsidized rice as the prices of other types of rice increase. This would then shift the demand curve from D to D1 while at the same time pushing the price of rice higher to point E1. However, at this new equilibrium price, the price ceiling will generate an even more severe shortage which will create an irresistible incentive for hoarding and smuggling.
The same concept would apply to government subsidies on oil. According to the International Herald Tribune, the ones reaping the biggest windfalls are not the poor consumers, but highly organized smuggling rings that siphon off the subsidized gasoline, diesel and kerosene to sell at a premium price abroad.[7] Instead of solving the problem of high oil prices, government subsidies may actually be fostering an ever growing illegal business of oil smuggling by providing them a very large profit margin incentive! What is worst is that increasing the number of patrols and security restrictions may not work the way authorities want them to. On the contrary, smugglers might increase smuggling activities and the price illegal oil prices because of the higher perceived risk and ever increasing demand.
Despite the long term adverse effects of price controls, they remain a very popular measure among authorities and urban citizens to this very day. The idea of using price controls to quickly and openly suppress the prices of certain goods and commodities in a relatively short time have always appealed greatly to many ruling governments as a fast solution to economic and political problems. When international food and fuel prices spike in recent years, Vladimir Putin was quick to imposed price controls on selected types of bread, cheese, milk, eggs and vegetable oil. Similarly, the Chinese government recently froze the prices of energy, transport and water, and announced that producers of essential food items, such as meat, grain, eggs and cooking oil must seek approval before raising prices.
While price control may work well in the short run, the marginal costs they incur will most certainly outweigh their marginal benefits in the long run. But because price controls will benefit one group (normally the urban citizens) at the expense of another group (normally the rural citizens), their implementation will enjoy a strong support from their beneficiaries. Besides that, the justification that price ceilings on agriculture produce are to help the poor is also a theory that should be viewed skeptically as a big portion of the poor that are involved in the agriculture sector would not benefit from lower selling prices. More often than not, price controls will be part of the problem rather than part of the solution.
References
1. Abolish ceiling on chicken price: farmers (21st April 2008), the Sun, pp10
available at: http://www.economist.com/finance/displaystory.cfm?story_id=10733112 (7th May 2008, 12:44 Am)
2. Campbell R. McConnell and Stanley L. Brue (2008), Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies, Mc Graw-Hill Companies, Inc, pp598-612
3. Daniel Gross (30th October 2007), Cry for Me, Argentina (and Russia and China), available at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/67042 (7th May 2008, 12:44 AM)
4. Donald Greenlees (27th September 2005), Asia oil subsidies bring windfall to smugglers, International Herald Tribune
5. Harga beras terus naik (2nd May 2008), Utusan Malaysia
6. In a fix: Putting caps on prices is only a short-term solution (21st February 2008), The Economist print edition,
7. Mark Harrison (2004), Why the Rich Won: Economic Mobilization and Economic Development in Two World Wars, University of Warwick, Department of Economics, United Kingdom
8. Ministries to tackle chicken price issue (1st May 2008), Nation N20, Star Newspaper
9. Rice bowl state runs out of grain (4th May 2008), Nation N3, Star Newspaper
10. Robert J.Samuelson (6th February 2008), It Ain’t the Economy, Stupid: Why no president can control our $14 trillion engine, available at: http://www.newsweek.com/id/108382 (7th May 2008, 12:44 AM)
11. Robert J.Samuelson (7th January 2008), Maybe it’s Not The Economy…That Matters in Picking The President, Because Today’s Boom Wasn’t Made In The White House, available at http://www.newsweek.com/id/85714 (7th May 2008, 12:44 AM)
12. Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (2006), Economics of the Two World Wars, University of Warwick, Department of Economics, United Kingdom
13. William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder (2006), Economics: Principles and Policy, Mc Graw-Hill Companies, Inc, pp53-73
[1] See William J. Baumol and Alan S. Blinder (2006), Economics: Principles and Policy
[2] Stephen Broadberry and Mark Harrison (2006), University of Warwick
[3] Robert J.Samuelson (2008), It Ain’t the Economy, Stupid: Why no president can control our $14 trillion engine
[4] See Campbell R. McConnell and Stanley L. Brue (2008), Economics: Principles, Problems, and Policies
[5] See Rice bowl state runs out of grain (4th May 2008), Nation N3, Star Newspaper
[6] See Harga beras terus naik (2nd May 2008), Utusan Malaysia
[7] See Asia oil subsidies bring windfall to smugglers (27th September 2005), International Herald Tribune
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The Economics of High Oil Prices
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I.
Abstract
The year 2008 has brought to Asia not only the Beijing Olympics games but also a hosts of economic calamities ranging from the spillover effects from the subprime crisis, the food crisis, and more importantly the unprecedented surge in international oil prices. History has shown us from the oil crisis in the 1970s that high oil prices severely affect economies in both the developed and developing countries. This research paper attempts to briefly study reasons for the spike in oil prices and the impact that high energy prices would bring to Malaysia and other Asian economies. Furthermore, knowing the challenges ahead is only part of the whole picture. More importantly, it is the response of the authorities in charge that will determine how well we weather this current crisis.
II.
Prelude
The end of the cold war, globalization, the rise of China and the rampant spread of information technology set the stage for a long spell of economic growth, high productivity, low inflation, and booming economy for not just the United States but for most of the rest of the world (Daniel Gross, 2007).[1] The acceleration of the flow of workers across borders to the most competitive markets during the past decade has been a potent disinflationary force that not only held down wage growth but inflation in virtually every country. Yet this period of unprecedented worldwide economic growth coupled with low inflation may be at its end as the subprime and financial crisis has all but crippled the economy of the United States while commodity prices of both food and fuel has reached previously unforeseeable heights.
Among all the commodity prices that are breaching record high prices, the price of oil emits the most concern from governments and citizens across the globe. Oil prices has been an unstoppable juggernaut since the early days of 2002 (back then, oil prices was merely at the US$20 level). Since the emerging economies of China and India took off, the price of oil has spiraled up to almost an alarming 600% and reaching a record high of US$147.27 on July 11 (Tee Lin Say, 2008).[2] According to Bob Lutz from General Motors, when the price of oil goes and stays up, it has a negative effect on the entire economy because oil is used in the production of virtually everything, including steel, aluminum, plastics, rubber, fabrics, transportation, and food (Daniel Gross, 2008).[3]
Yet why are oil prices so high? While many governments and analyst around the world blame speculators for artificially propping up oil prices (this is true to a certain extent), one must be reminded that speculators speculate according to market conditions that are set by fundamental factors of supply and demand. According to Tony Hayward from British Petroleum (BP), there is enough oil to maintain world consumption at current levels for another 42 years and to add to that, the world could probably unearth another one trillion barrels of oil should it really wanted to (The Economist, June 11th 2008). According to the data obtained from BP, the proven reserves of the world in 2007 remains at healthy levels.

Mr Hayward continues by saying that one of the reasons petrol prices are so high is because some 80% of the world’s oil reserves are in the hands of state-owned oil firms that tend to allow international oil companies limited access. This can evidently be seen in countries such as Russia and Venezuela that welcome the high-tech and well-capitalized oil firms when prices are high and chase them out when prices are low. BP’s data also shows that global output of oil fell last year and combining that with a decline in proven reserves (1.6 billion barrels) suggests that the world is consuming oil faster than it can be found. Countries like Mexico and Norway have an inevitable decline in output while Nigeria’s output is affected by political unrest.

In line with the data obtained from BP, Sadad I. Al Husseini a Saudi oil geologist, also calculated that output would be leveling off (stagnant output) as early as 2004 with this “production plateau” lasting 15 years (at best) and after which output of oil would begin to decline (Paul Roberts, 2008).[4] One of the reasons for the decline in oil output is because most of the big and easily located fields were discovered decades ago and the recent oil field findings tend to be smaller fields. Oil producers are now stuck in having to find greater number of oil fields to produce the same amount of oil. Smaller oil fields are more costly to operate as small oil fields in ten different locations would require 10 oil rigs compared to the lesser number of oil rigs at big oil fields.
Malaysia remains an oil exporter until the year 2011 after which Malaysia would be a net oil importer. Recently to the horror of business firms and households alike, the petrol and diesel prices in Malaysia rose 41% and 63% respectively. While the raising of energy prices in Malaysia is not totally unexpected, the Government’s latest move have prompt many of us to look back at the cause and effects of subsidies itself. While economists agree subsidies are unsustainable and implemented to the benefit of the rich, the adverse effect on the Malaysian economy in the short-term must also be carefully studied.
III.
Impact on GDP growth
According to Roger A. Arnold (2008), the gross domestic product (GDP) refers to the total market value of all final goods and services produced annually within a country’s borders.5] Based on the expenditure approach in computing GDP, a country’s GDP is the sum of its consumption, investment, government purchases, and net exports. While the GDP is a good measure of the total output capacity of a country, a country’s GDP omits certain underground activities (for example, the selling of illegal DVDs and VCDs), the sale of used goods, and financial transactions. Furthermore, a country’s GDP is only the aggregate total of an economy’s output and it does not represent the equality in income of its citizens.
The impact of high oil prices on Malaysia’s GDP growth would depend on the exposure of the Malaysian economy to oil, particularly in terms of domestic consumption and the extent of the spillover effect of the increase in costs on other products and services. At the first glance as an oil exporting country, high oil prices would benefit the Malaysian economy as the positive gains from higher oil prices would offset any negative impact on the economy. This is done through pump priming whereby revenue from higher oil prices can be channeled back in to the domestic economy through Government expenditure. This research paper would attempt to look at both the benefits and the adverse affects on the economy of higher oil prices.
There are two sides to an economy. There is the demand side in an economy is referred to as aggregate demand (AD) and the supply side that is referred to as aggregate supply (AS). Higher energy prices caused by the rapid increase in oil prices would transmit into the economy by reducing the real income of households and prompting them to reduce consumption. This happens due to the real balance effect that states the inverse relationship between price level and quantity demanded of Real GDP established through the changes in the value of monetary wealth (McConnell & Brue, 2008). As the price level in the economy increases, the purchasing power, and monetary wealth of households and businesses declines, thus resulting in a decline in quantity demanded of goods and services in the economy.
On the supply side, high oil prices would then spread throughout the economy, driving up production and distribution costs on a wide variety of goods that will induce firms to reduce output (McConnell & Brue, 2008).[6] The increase in production and distribution costs would be caused by factors such as the rise in expected price level, workers demanding higher wages (wage push), and increases in non-labor inputs such as raw materials (Frederic Mishkin, 2007). These factors would cause the short-run aggregate supply curve to shift to the left. Figure 1 shows what happens when the short-run aggregate supply shifts. Suppose the economy is initially at the natural rate level of output at point 1 when the drop in quantity demanded and leftward shift in short-run aggregate supply shifts from AS1 to AS2 because of a sharp rise in energy prices.
The economy will move from point 1 to point 2, where price level rises but aggregate output falls. This situation of a rising price level and falling level of aggregate output pictured in Figure 1 is known as stagflation which is a combination of economic stagnation and inflation (Frederic Mishkin, 2007). In line with this, the Malaysian Institute of Economic Research (Mier) has recently revised downwards its real gross domestic product (GDP) growth forecast for this year from 5.4% to 4.6% (this is below the Government’s target of 5% to 6%).[7] The executive director of Mier Professor Datuk Dr Mohamed Ariff Abdul Kareem said that the weaker outlook was due to the impact of the slowing US economy, soaring food prices, rising global oil prices, and local political instability.
The Malaysian net exports are also likely to be affected from the surging oil prices and the slowdown in the US economy. Earlier this year (2008), the argument was that the emerging Asian economic powerhouses like China and India would cushion the impact of from a slowdown in developed economies. According to the World Economic Outlook report by the International Monetary Fund (IMF) in April 2008, there would be a 25% chance that the global economy would face a recession should growth be 3% or lower this year and next. A slowdown in developed countries (particularly the United States) would have an adverse effect on Malaysia’s GDP growth as the demand for Malaysian exports decline.
Year 2000


Emerging economies like Malaysia which are export-intensive (having a current account surplus of Rm100.5 billion in 2007) would face an economic slowdown as the demand for exports from developed countries decline. Based on data obtained from Bank Negara Malaysia, the United States is still Malaysia’s biggest export destination. According to CIMB Investment Bank Bhd head of economic research Lee Heng Guie said that a 1% decline in US GDP growth could potentially trim Malaysia’s export growth by 0.8% percentage points, leading to a 1 percentage point decline in GDP growth.[8] Should this be true, an economic slowdown faced in the United States could adversely affect the Malaysian economy as through the trade links of the two countries.
IV.
Impact on Inflation
Inflation, a continuous rise in price level, affects individuals, businesses, and the Government (Frederic Mishkin, 2007). High inflation is undesirable as it erodes the purchasing power of money that causes a drop in real income (and thus a drop in an individual’s standard of living), the weakening of a country’s currency, and a decline in long-term economic growth. According to Frederic Mishkin (1997), price stability in the long-run is achieved through a low and stable inflation rate that promotes a higher level of economic output and a more rapid economic growth.[9] Economists generally measure the price level by the consumer price index (CPI) which is a weighted average of the prices of all goods and services purchased by a typical household (referred to as the market basket).
The Malaysian consumer price index comprise mainly of three categories, namely food & non alcoholic beverages, housing, water electricity, gas & other fuels, and transportation. The combined weight of these three categories amounts to 68.7% of the total consumer price index. Relative to developed countries like the United States, Japan, and developed countries in Europe, Malaysia has a higher level of exposure to the adverse impacts of the increase in oil prices as a higher proportion of Malaysian households’ income goes into food and fuel (both of which increased rapidly after the fuel hike in June). In contrast to developing countries, households in developed countries like the United States which spends a lesser proportion on food and fuel and are able to cut back on the purchases of optional goods to cater for higher energy prices.
The severe adverse impacts of the fuel hike in June can be seen when the consumer price index rose to a 27-year high of 7.7% for the month of June from 3.8% in the month of May.[10] The consumer price index is likely to remain high in as the fuel hike in June would be followed by an increase in the electricity tariff in the month of August. The jump in the consumer price index is caused by the adjustments made by households and businesses (reduction in quantity demanded of goods and services and the drop in economic output) that were previously insulated from the surging international market oil prices through government fuel subsidies and various other price controls like those previously seen in the local cement and steel industries.

While a high inflation rate and a higher cost of living is normally measured through the consumer price index, in reality a high inflation rate does not affect all citizens equally. When income levels come into consideration, high inflation normally hit the hardest on the poor rather than the rich. Furthermore, a retired person or any unemployed individual is very likely to be hit by inflation on a larger scale than a higher income earning individual (assuming the higher paid individual’s income rises in tandem or faster than price levels). This is because the unemployed individual is relying on his/her money kept in the bank which purchasing power, due to high inflation is eroding. Without the chance of benefiting from any economic growth in the society, the unemployed individual is stuck with a higher cost of living without any compensation in any form
The Consumer Price Index (CPI) which is commonly used as a measure of inflation might not be a correct representation of the way inflation affects us. The calculations of the CPI may be distorted because it is the average price of goods and services purchased by households when the highest rise in prices may be in products that people cannot live without (fuel and food).
According to the Household Expenditure Survey, the main expenditure of households would be centered on four categories firstly, food and non-alcoholic beverages, secondly, housing, water, electricity, gas and other fuels, Third, transportation and fourth, restaurants and hotels. A further breakdown on this four categories in terms of income levels from below Rm 500, Rm 500 to Rm 4,999, and Rm 5,000 and above shows us that poorer individuals (below Rm 500) spends 38.8% of their household expenditure on food and non-alcoholic beverages compared to the richer individuals (above Rm 5,000) that spends 9.4% on the same items.

Further results from the Department of Statistics shows us that poorer individuals (below Rm 500) spends only 4.2% of their household expenditure on transportation compared to the richer individuals (above Rm 5,000) that spends 27.8% on the transportation. This indirectly and ironically shows us that our painful fuel subsidy (Rm 16 billion, January-August 2007) helps the rich more than the poor. Furthermore, while poorer individuals would have no choice but to tighten their belts when the prices of food soar as a high proportion of their income goes into food and energy.
V.
Interest rate outlook
Despite inflationary pressures building up, the Malaysian central bank has recently decided to leave interest rates unchanged by maintaining the overnight policy rate (OPR) after the monetary policy meeting held on 26 July 2008. The decision by Bank Negara to leave the OPR at 3.5% immediately resulted in the stock market rallying (KLCI ended up 12.34 points, or 1.08% higher) and the weakening of the Malaysian ringgit (Loong Tse Min, 2008).[11] However, according to the same source, the weakening of the ringgit may also be due to the political risk expectations of foreign investors in the country.
Bank Negara stated in an issued statement that, “while both the risks to higher inflation and the risks to slower growth have increased, the immediate concern is to avoid a fundamental economic slowdown that would involve higher unemployment.” By leaving the OPR at 3.5%, the interest rate in Malaysia is among the lowest in Asia (together with interest rates in Hong Kong and Thailand). In a way, the central bank’s move to maintain the benchmark interest rate is justified as the high inflation in June was not demand driven (demand-pull inflation) but due to the adjustments made by households and businesses to the increase in energy prices (Izwan Idris, 2008).[12]
Furthermore, cost-push inflation driven by supply shocks (a leftward shift of short-run aggregate supply) limits the effectiveness of monetary policy in reigning in inflation. The rationale is that reducing the money supply in the market by increasing interest rates which is the cost of borrowing money would not reduce international oil prices. On top of that, raising the OPR would add additional burden to manufacturers, property developers, and business firms that are already facing the increase costs of raw materials and operating costs.
However, keeping interest rates low has also widen the negative gap between the OPR and the CPI. This means that the erosion of purchasing power of money would increase more rapidly and there would be less foreign capital entering Malaysia. This would result in the ringgit weakening against foreign currencies which would increase the cost of imports. As Malaysia is a net importer of food (which prices have risen to record levels), imported inflation would add more fuel to inflationary pressures in the country. The alternative would be to gradually raise interest rates (by 25-basis points) to shield local consumers from imported inflation at the expense of a decline in economic growth.
VI.
Currency Outlook
The Malaysian ringgit has appreciated last year due to the removal of some of the capital controls that were put in place in the 1997 Asian financial crisis, and the weakening of the US dollar due to the subprime and financial crisis. The upward trend of the ringgit is likely to be at its end as the Malaysian economy faces twin shocks from food and fuel prices. According to Alan C. Shapiro (2005), a currency’s exchange rate is determined by its supply and demand which is affected by factors such as inflation rates, interest rates, economic growth, and political and economic risk.[13]
As seen from the previous findings the impact of the increase in oil prices on GDP, and inflation, we can see that Malaysia faces an economic slowdown and high inflation that would put pressures on the ringgit to depreciate. Bank Negara has also recently chose not to increase the benchmark interest rate to maintain economic growth and employment at the expense of a higher price level which prompted the ringgit to depreciate further (refer to interest rate outlook). Contradicting the monetary policy of Bank Negara, regional central banks are taking a tougher stand against inflation by tightening monetary policy to strengthen their currencies (Yeow Pooi Ling & Yvonne Tan, 2008).[14]
Most notable of all is Singapore and China which are using currency appreciation to control inflation. By strengthening the local currency, Malaysia would have to sacrifice a certain degree of its export competitiveness to shield domestic consumers against imported inflation. Though Malaysia is a crude oil exporting country, it is also a net importer of food which in part due to surging oil prices have spiked to record levels. To strengthen the local currency, the central bank should increase interest rates or widen the currency-trading band. This would reduce the money supply in the market, and partially shield consumers from imported inflation.
VIII.
Impact on fiscal budget
A country’s fiscal budget comprises of government expenditures (the sum of government purchases and government transfer payments) and tax revenues (Arnold, 2008).[15] Malaysia has a long standing fiscal deficit whereby government expenditures are greater than tax revenues of approximately 3% to 4% of gross domestic product. According to Datuk Dr Mohamed Ariff Abdul Kareem, Malaysia has the highest budget deficit as a percentage of GDP within Asean. However, the budget deficit is said to be within a manageable range and is forecasted to remain at current levels.
As stated above, the fiscal deficit of a country depends on government expenditure and tax revenues. Holding everything else constant, a decline in Real GDP due to rising oil prices would result in a decline of Malaysia’s tax base and if tax rates are held constant, tax revenues will fall. Furthermore, should oil prices continue to increase, the amount of government subsidies on fuel and other essential items would also increase. Thus, the Government’s expenditure will rise and tax revenues would fall resulting in an increase in the country’s fiscal deficit.
However, Malaysia is a net exporter of crude oil (unrefined petrol) which according to Petronas, churns out 600,000 barrels per day of which 339,000 barrels per day are refined locally (the balance is exported as crude oil). Based on the demand growth before the petrol price hike in June of six percent per year, Malaysia’s demand will exceed local production in 2011. This would result the country becoming a net importer of oil even though Malaysia still has oil reserves for another 22 years and gas reserves for 39 years.[16]
It is likely that the Malaysian fiscal budget remains unchanged in the coming years. Due to the presence of both inflation and an economic slowdown, the usage of fiscal policy to solve domestic economic problems is severely limited. Suppose the economy is at point 1 in Figure 5 due to the increase in oil prices that shift the short-run aggregate supply curve to the left away from the long-run aggregate supply. Should the government attempt the make use of expansionary fiscal policy measures either by increasing government expenditure or reducing taxes, the aggregate demand curve would shift to the right from point 1 to point 2.

At point 2, the economy is back at the natural rate of unemployment and the Real GDP has increased but price level has increased from P1 to P2. Due to the present of high inflation caused by the price hike in petrol, further expansionary policies by the government would add to already mounting inflation rates and expectations of inflation. Similarly, continuing the fuel subsidy would be equally disastrous as it would result in a long-run shortage of fuel in the country. Figure 6 shows that suppose price of petrol is at point A while market equilibrium prices are at point E, the long-run impact would be that there would be a shortage a fuel due to the difference between quantity demanded of fuel (point A) and quantity supplied of fuel (point B).
IX.
Domestic Risk
The rising trend in international oil prices is likely to increase the domestic risk in Malaysia. It is important for both the government and citizens alike to understand that the economy works in a circular flow by which a change in a single part or industry in an economy is likely to cause changes in other parts of the economy as well. A good example of this is the spillover effect of high energy prices into other sectors of the economy like agriculture through the increased costs in fertilizers and transportation.
Knowing that no economy or sector is an island that is unaffected by occurrences happening elsewhere in seemingly unrelated industries is a good vantage point in which to judge the domestic risk in Malaysia. Through the easing of petrol subsidies in June, producers of goods and services faced an increase in their production and distribution costs that are eating into their profitability. In order to protect their real income, producers past on the cost to consumers which results in an increase in the general price level of the economy.
As consumers now face higher prices for their goods and services, they cut back on consumption and the real GDP of the economy falls. Faced with both inflation and a decline a real GDP, the central bank is trapped in a position whereby an increase in interest rates to rein in inflation would cause a more severe economic slowdown. On the other hand, leaving the Malaysian OPR rate unchanged at its current 3.5% would cause a drop in value of the Malaysian ringgit against foreign currencies which would further fuel inflation.
The combination of a slowdown in the domestic economy, high inflation, and a decline in the ringgit’s value relative to other currencies increases the risk of doing business in Malaysia. Foreigner investors with assets denominated in ringgit would fear that a drop in the country’s currency would affect the value of their assets. Furthermore, local investors face an interest rate risk should the central bank decide to increase interest rate to combat inflation. An increase in interest rate would cause some borrowers to default and the value of certain assets (like property) to decline.
According to the Star newspaper, some of the potential risks and challenges facing the domestic market include:
- · Rising operational costs resulting from surging prices of commodities
- Government’s on-going reduction on petrol subsidies causing higher fuel prices
- Possible electricity tariff hikes
- Malaysia’s growth slows down more than anticipated
- Execution risk on implementation of 9th Malaysian Plan development projects, hence dampening the multiplier effect
- Substantial softening of crude palm oil prices
- The Visit Malaysia Year 2007 (which was extended to 2008) fails to generate interest as it did last year
- Poor response from EPF members on the monthly EPF withdrawal scheme
- Resurgence of inflation
2004

2008

Also to be noted is the results of the recent 2008 elections which indicate that the National Front has los the popular vote in peninsular Malaysia. The country risk of Malaysia as of now is relatively high as foreign investors now shun committing funds and resources in Malaysia for fears of political instability.

X.
Impact on Malaysia’s competitiveness
It is a common misperception that countries blessed with natural resources like oil would result in higher economic growth prospects and higher competitiveness against countries that are forced to spend large amounts of money to import these resources. Yet as history has often proven to us, this is seldom true and countries with natural resources are often plagued with a resource curse which leads to corruption, wastage, and mismanagement of the economy. Topping the list are countries like Russia and Venezuela that though are rich in natural resources are plagued with economic mismanagement.
According to the Centre for Public Policy Studies director Tricia Yeoh, natural resources do not necessarily bring greater growth and development to a country.[18] In her paper titled Promoting Revenue Transparency in Malaysia, Tricia takes for example how per capita incomes in resource-deficient countries grew two to three times faster than resource-reliant export-driven countries between 1960 and 1990. According to the International Monetary Fund, a country is resource-reliant of at least 26% of its national revenues derive from extractive industries like oil, gas, and minerals.
Malaysia is a resource-reliant country with a huge portion of government revenues coming from the oil and gas industry. Similar with most resource-reliant countries like those in the Middle East and Latin America, Malaysia is behind the curve in adopting freer trade, property rights (remember the Boonsom Boonyanit land law case), economic freedom, and privatization of state owned companies. The presence of oil and gas in Malaysia has created and artificial sense of wealth to which the petrol-dollars are used to pump and prim the economy and subsidize a number of essential consumer items.
On top of that, the Malaysian ringgit used to be pegged to the greenback thus making it undervalued in terms of purchasing power parity to other regional currencies. This has made Malaysian exports cheaper relative to other countries and resulted in a booming export industry and a current account surplus. While the oil price hike in June is detrimental to the Malaysian export industry, it is likely that domestic firms in Malaysia would become more competitive. The reason for this is that as the costs of doing business increase, Malaysian companies would be forced to innovate and generate more income in order to protect their profit margins and ensure their survival.
Furthermore, the increase in costs would breed an environment to which companies with substandard performance in certain industries are forced to stop operations and change into more profitable industries. A highly competitive environment like this would foster more creative destruction which according to Joseph Schumpeter would revitalize itself by scrapping old and failing businesses and reallocating resources to newer and more productive industries.[19] This is the cornerstone and ultimate advantage that capitalist economies have over centrally planned ones.
Table 5 shows us that the foreign direct investments flowing into Malaysia have not reached pre-Asian crisis levels. This is a signal that should Malaysia continue to delay opening up its economy, it is going to lose out against regional economies like Thailand and Singapore. In a globalized world, foreign funds flow to countries with the most well managed economy and shun countries which adopt protectionist policies. It is important for Malaysia to move up the value chain by forcing local companies to be more competitive in their struggle for survival and profitability.
XI.
Impact on Asian economies
The impact on Asian economies depends on the individual characteristics of the countries in the region. Generally households in developing countries in Asia spend a larger portion of their household income on energy and food compared to developed countries in North America and Europe. This implies to us that the exposure of Asian economies towards high oil prices is relatively high. However, countries in Asia are very diverse and the effects of the high oil prices should be measured separately.
Among all the countries in Asia, China stands out as the economic powerhouse in the region. The country accounts for a fifth of the world’s population, yet it consumes up to half of the world’s pork, half of its cement, a third of its steel, and over a quarter of its aluminum.[20] While inflation in China is likely to spike, China’s GDP growth is likely to remain approximately 10% for the year 2008 before falling to 8-9% in 2009 due to strong domestic demand. China is increasing the reserve requirements of its banks and gradually allowing the yuan to appreciate against foreign currencies to control inflation.
However, countries like China and India with a big population base and high income inequality is likely to suffer the adverse consequences of high inflation. All across the region, inflation is eating into the economic growth of Asian economies. Vietnam in particular has an inflation rate of 26.8% in the month of June largely due to higher oil prices and its local economy overheating. Not far behind is Indonesia and the Philippines which both have an inflation rate of 11% in the month of June
Furthermore, most Asian economies are export-oriented economies and have strong trade links to the developed countries like the United States. The economic slowdown in the United States is likely to result in a slowdown in Asian economies. Most adversely affected would be countries like Singapore which has a strong exposure to a economic slowdown in the United States but also imports most of its essential items. To mitigate the risk of imported inflation, Singapore has also allowed its currency to appreciate further against other foreign currencies.
According to the Star newspaper on 23rd June, Asian economies are likely to sustain their economic growth even though they suffer from the twin shocks of inflation and an economic slowdown in the United States. My own personal forecast is that there would be a slowdown in Asian economies as inflation start eating into Real GDP growth. Besides that, the demand for Asian exports (with maybe only the exception of China) is likely to decline. Domestic demand in Asian economies may also face a decline as high energy and food prices take out a chunk of real household income.
The surging energy prices are also likely to result in political instability in the region. South Korea and Taiwan have already changed their ruling government. Other countries like Malaysia and Thailand is deemed by investors to be politically unstable. It is likely that the drop in the standard of living and economic mismanagement in Asian countries are the critical factors to which politicians in Asia will utilize to win votes in the elections. Such populists’ promises may result in greater economic problems like those seen in Latin America.
XII.
Conclusion
As my findings have shown, the rapid increase in oil prices would spillover into other major sectors of the economy and fueling headline and core inflation while at the same causing a slowdown in Malaysia’s economy. This period of stagflation would limit the use of fiscal and monetary policy to solve short-term economic problems in the country. On top of that, many economists have argued that increasing interest rates to put a lid on inflation may not be an option as inflation is not driven by demand but by increases in costs. The best solution would be to open up the Malaysian economy by fostering more open competition, freer trade, and the removal of price controls. This would enable the retaining of human capital, the increase in domestic firms’ competitiveness, and a better allocation of scarce resources. Yet for authorities to do so, a lot of political discipline is needed as beneficiaries from the current system groups would firmly campaign against such a move. As usual, there is no such thing as a free lunch and short-term sacrifices need to be made to guarantee long-term prosperity.
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[1] Daniel Gross, September 24, 2007, The Greenspan Gospel, Newsweek, Inc, Vol. CL, No.13, New York, pp 17
[2] Tee Lin Say, July 26, 2008, Oil – how low can it go?, The Star Newspaper, No. 17899, BizWeek, pp12
[3] Daniel Gross, June 16, 2008, Why It’s Worse Than You Think, Newsweek, Inc, Vol. CLI, No. 24, New York, pp17-27
[4] Paul Roberts, June 2008,Tapped Out, National Geographic, Vol. 213. No. 6, National Geographic Society, United States, pp87-91
[5] Roger A. Arnold, 2008, Economics 8th edition, Thomson South-Western, Thomson Corporation, United States of America
[6] McConnell & Brue, 2008, Economics, McGraw-Hill/Irwin, The McGraw-Hill Companies Inc, New York
[7] Malaysian Institute of Economic Research, Mier growth forecast lower than Government’s target, Starbiz, The Star Newspaper, 18 July 2008, No. 17891
[8] Fintan Ng & Suraj Raj, Emerging economies still rely on the super powers, Special Focus, The Star Newspaper, 9 June 2008, No. 17852 pp15
[9] Frederic Mishkin, 1997, Strategies for controlling inflation, National Bureau of Economic Research, NBER working paper series, Working paper 6122, Cambridge
[10] Fintan Ng, Rates: To raise or not to raise?, News, The Star Newspaper, 25 June 2008, No. 17898, pp5
[11] Loong Tse Min, Two-pronged impact, Starbiz, The Star Newspaper, 29th July 2008, No. 17902, pp3
[12] Izwan Idris, Bank Negara holds off raising rates, Starbiz, The Star Newspaper, 26th July 2008, No. 17899, pp1
[13] Alan C. Shapiro, 2005, Multinational Finance 5th Edition, John Wiley & Sons, Inc, United States of America p36-37
[14] Yeow Pooi Ling & Yvonne Tan, Rocky road ahead for Asian currencies, Starbiz, The Star Newspaper, No. 17890, p8
[15] Roger A. Arnold, 2008, Economics 8th edition, Thomson South-Western, Thomson Corporation, United States of America
[16] Santha Oorjitham, On managing and allocating subsidies, The News Strait Times, 18th June 2008, No. 10597, p22-23
[17] Daljit Dhesi, Strong spending seen despite volatile market, Starbiz, The Star Newspaper, 28th January 2008, p5
[18] Tricia Yeoh, ‘Resource curse’ leads to wastage, Starbiz, The Star Newspaper, 23rd July 2008, p2
[19] Alan Greenspan, 2007, The Age of Turbulence, Allen Lane, Penguin Group, England, p48
[20] The Economists, The new colonialist, The Economist Newspaper Limited, London, 15th March 2008, volume 386, number 8571, p13
Inflation: Challenges and Response
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The Gold Standard
Inflation, which is defined by Frederic Mishkin (2007) as the condition of a continually and rapidly rising price level is similar in some sense as water is to human beings. Too much water (hyperinflation) causes massive floods while the lack of water or the absence of water (deflation) causes droughts. What is required is a steady and constant supply of water which central banks commonly refer to as low and stable inflation. Frederic Mishkin (2000) stated that price stability (which is obtained through a low and stable inflation) should be the overriding, long-run goal of monetary policy.
Inflation and World War II
Winston Churchill once said: “that the further backward you look the further forward you can see”. World War II (1939-1945) the largest and costliest war in terms of men and money is seldom linked to inflation. Yet a brief walk back through time brings us to the situation in Europe during 1918 when the cost of World War I had forced belligerent nations to ‘print money’ not backed by productive wealth. In doing so, the governments of Europe made money in circulation worth less and the people suffered because of the reduction in their purchasing power and the lost in their real wealth.
Among the nations involved, Germany stands out as the German government during that time printed huge amounts of currency that made the German mark’s value collapse leading to the German Hyperinflation (followed by a period of deflation) and setting the stage for Adolf Hitler’s assent to power. The German government itself did not encourage inflation but wanted to avoid a post war (World War I) recession, to revive its industrial capacity, and to create high employment.
I am not saying that the sole cause of World War II was inflation but one can see the sequence and chain of events of how high inflation (through the excessive printing of money) led to uncontrollable hyperinflation which in turn cause financial and political instability that resulted in the horrors man experienced in World War II. Clearly inflation is a force to be reckoned with and this example alone should be enough to justify the importance of knowing how inflation affects each and everyone of us.
However, is not inflation and World War II a relic of the past? Have not the central banks across the globe proven their ability and their credibility to keep inflation at bay while at the same time promoting economic growth. Even Frederic Mishkin (1997) stated that inflation has fallen dramatically in many industrialized as well as emerging countries reaching a point where many economists arguably regarded as price stability.
A recent interview with legendary ex-Chairman of the Federal Reserve, Alan Greenspan, stated that the end of the cold war, globalization, the rise of China and the rampant spread of information technology were huge disinflationary forces that helped economic growth, high productivity, and booming markets. However, the time of bliss might soon come to an end as the rate of foreign workers might start to slow while China’s wage-rate growth may start to mount hinting the inevitable rise of exports from China (export prices from China rose in spring 2007 for the first time in years). The recent petrol price crisis further reinforces the importance of understanding inflation. All these events will spark a rise in inflation and more importantly expectations of inflation that may disrupt price stability in the future.
Why do people dislike inflation
Frederic Mishkin (2007) defines inflation as the condition of a continually and rapidly rising price level. Inflation is a phenomenon whereby too much money is chasing too few goods thereby reducing the value of money versus the increased value of goods. Studies show that inflation is the most common economic term used by the general public. We hear about inflation in the news, in political speeches, in seminars, and even in coffee shops. But why do people dislike inflation?
Contrary to popular believe, inflation is not simply a one time increase in price levels but a process that happens continuously. People normally view inflation as the cause of a lower purchasing power of their hard earned cash which would ultimately result in a lower standard of living (people must forgo the consumption of certain optional goods for example, an iPod due to the increased prices of necessities). However, this perception of inflation is not completely accurate because certain individuals may experience increase in wages that offset any loss of purchasing power due to inflation.
Furthermore, some economists believe that since inflation normally comes together with economic growth, it may lead to an increase in real income at the end of the day. Therefore inflation is not the sole cause that erodes an individual’s standard of living (though many of us think so). But one fact stands out more obvious than any other and that is that inflation does not affect all of us equally. When you take income levels into consideration, inflation normally hit the hardest on the poor rather than the rich.
A retired person or any unemployed individual is very likely to be hit by inflation on a larger scale than a higher income earning individual (assuming the higher paid individual’s income rises in tandem or faster than price levels). This is because the unemployed individual is relying on his/her money kept in the bank which value, due to inflation is eroding. Without the chance of benefiting from any economic growth in the society, the unemployed individual is stuck with a higher cost of living without any compensation in any form.
Inflation has recently become one of the hottest topics discussed by central bankers around the world. A low and stable inflation rate is the goal of most central banks today as it fosters lower economic uncertainty and higher long term economic growth. Milton Friedman’s success in proving the flaw in the Philip curve (a graph that shows the relationship between inflation and unemployment rate) has also shown the world that lower unemployment cannot be ‘bought’ by higher inflation (most commonly achieved through excessive government spending that stimulates demand). Yet despite so, inflation continues to be a major issue to every individual.
Strategies For Controlling Inflation
Summary
The working paper that is the subject of today’s study and review is the ‘Strategies for Controlling Inflation’ as written by Frederic S. Mishkin in 1997. The working paper by Mr Mishkin was prepared for the Reserve Bank of Australia’s 1997 Conference on Monetary Policy and Inflation Targeting. The main agenda of this research paper is to examine how central banks across the globe set monetary policy in order to control inflation to achieve price stability. This working paper also suggests ways in which the gains in lowering inflation can be maintained.
The first part of the working paper is centered upon the growing consensus for price stability among central bankers. There are two reasons why inflation is given such a high priority. First, activist monetary policy that aims to reduce unemployment in the short run might not be achievable. Second, price stability leads to higher economic growth and output in the long run. According to Milton Friedman, activist monetary policy that is used to reduce unemployment in the short run might not be achievable because of long and variable lags in the economy. This might cause overly expansionary monetary policy that will eventually lead to an overheating economy. Besides that, it is now known that there is no trade off between unemployment and inflation. This was because the Philips curve analysis left out an important factor affecting wages and price inflation namely the expectation of inflation. Therefore unemployment cannot be continually increased with higher inflation. Furthermore, the time-inconsistency problem also poses a challenge to activist monetary policy as economic behavior is affected by expectations of future monetary policy. This will in turn result in higher inflation with no increase in output after a certain level.
The next part of the working paper attempts to prove the importance of price stability as a long term goal for monetary policy. The reason for this is because price stability helps the economic system to run more smoothly and efficiently. There are many costs that inflation will give the economy. The first cost is the ‘shoe leather cost’ of inflation whereby it requires huge and ever increasing amounts of cash to conduct transactions. Besides that, another cost of inflation is the difficulty to form decisions about future expenditures. Higher inflation increases the uncertainty of prices that will hamper production of goods and services. Inflation also becomes a tax like system as a rise in inflation increases the cost of capital which lowers investments below its optimal level.
The first strategy outlined in Mishkin’s working paper is the exchange rate peg which is done by pegging a country’s currency with the anchor currency of another larger country with low inflation. This is done in hope that the country’s inflation level will slowly adjust to the anchor currency’s country. Another variation of the exchange rate pegging involves a crawling peg or target so that the country’s currency is allowed to depreciate at a steady rate. The advantage of the exchange rate pegging strategy is that it provides a nominal anchor so as to help overcome the time-inconsistency problem. With a strong commitment to the exchange rate peg, this strategy forms an automatic monetary rule that forces the tightening or loosening of monetary policy. Besides that, the exchange rate peg is simple, clear, and easily understood by the public. Furthermore, an exchange rate peg helps to quickly bring down inflation levels to those of the targeted country.
However, there are a many disadvantages of exchange rate pegging. First, is the loss of independent monetary policy for the country adopting the exchange rate peg. Second, any inflationary pressures to the anchor country would be transmitted to the targeting country. Third, the exchange rate peg might leave countries open to speculative attacks on their currencies. Fourth, in emerging countries, exchange rate pegs might trigger a full scale financial crisis and severe economic contractions. Worse still is the possibility of increased inflation after a speculative attack that defeats the purpose of the exchange rate peg as a strategy to control inflation.
The second strategy used to combat inflation is monetary targeting. Some countries are too large and there are no countries for them to anchor their currency to. Milton Friedman suggested for a constant money-growth-rate rule whereby a monetary aggregate for example, M2, is targeted to grow at a constant rate. The advantage of monetary targeting is that it gives to the central bank the discretion and ability to adjust its monetary policy to suit domestic considerations. This strategy is similar to the exchange rate peg in certain ways by providing an easily understood nominal anchor to the public and also promoting the accountability of the central bank to keep inflation low so as to eliminate the time-inconsistency problem.
There are also disadvantages through the adoption of monetary targeting. The greatest drawback is that the strategy is centered upon the assumption of a strong and reliable relationship between the goal variable (inflation target) and the targeted variable (monetary growth target). Should there be a weak relationship between the variables, achieving the targeted monetary growth would not result in the desired outcome because it will not provide a clear signal to the stance of monetary policy. The second disadvantage is that the targeted monetary aggregate must be controlled properly by the central bank. Should this fail, the monetary aggregate would not give a clear signal about the intentions of the central bank and make them less accountable (especially in the case of M2 and M3).
The third strategy to control inflation is through inflation targeting which is done through a public announcement of medium term numerical targets for inflation with a commitment by monetary authorities to achieve these targets. The main advantages of inflation targeting include the increased accountability of the central bank to achieve its inflation target and with that eliminating to a certain extent the time-inconsistency problem. Furthermore, inflation targeting does not require a stable money-inflation relationship thereby giving the central bank full flexibility in setting the best domestic monetary policy.
Inflation targeting also has weaknesses as inflation is not as easily controlled compared to exchange rates and monetary aggregates. Going deeper into the subject, long lags in monetary policy also causes inflation outcomes to occur after a longer period of time thereby making inflation targets not an immediate signal to the public and market on the stance of monetary policy. Besides that, inflation targeting is argued to give central banks too little discretion to respond to unforeseen circumstances. More importantly however, is that inflation targeting may lead to larger output fluctuations and increased unemployment in order to achieve price stability. Other arguments against inflation targeting include GDP targeting (however the argument against GDP targeting is also strong).
The last strategy used by central banks to control inflation is the ‘just do it’ or preemptive monetary policy without an explicit nominal anchor. This policy is unique because it does not require an explicit nominal anchor like exchange rates, monetary aggregate, or an inflation target. Instead this strategy focuses on preemptive strikes against inflation. This policy is known for bringing and maintaining a low inflation in the United States through the leadership of Federal Reserve Chairman, Alan Greenspan. By giving the central bank more discretion, this policy solves the economic problem by adopting a forward-looking behavior.
Some of the disadvantages of the ‘just do it’ strategy is its lack of transparency which may cause financial and economic uncertainty. Furthermore, because of the absence of an explicit nominal anchor, the central bank is less accountable and therefore vulnerable to the time-inconsistency problem. This will in turn cause the leadership of the central bank to be of huge importance as they will have more freedom to pursue the monetary policy they choose. Moreover, politicians may be able to put pressure on the central bank to pursue favorable policies for short term benefits.
Critique
Frederic Mishkin has highlighted four common strategies used by central banks to control inflation. To further study and discuss on these four strategies, we must first discuss some of the basic requirements that these strategies must solve in order for them to be viable and feasible from an economic point of view. Fortunately, Frederic Mishkin (2000) has written on some of the guiding principles for central banks[1]. Among them include the attainment of price stability which is seen to be a long-run goal for a number of central banks today. This is because price stability encourages healthy economic growth by lowering uncertainty, information distortion, and preventing overinvestment in the financial sector (to escape inflation). A strategy to control inflation must also be able to avoid the trap of time-inconsistency whereby short run ‘gains’ (employment and higher economic output) might bring long run ‘pains’ (inflation). Besides that, monetary policy should be forward looking. This is because they are time lags and price stickiness that may delay the effects of monetary policy. The next criterion is accountability and transparency that will force central banks to be responsible and to also serve as a benchmark of performance. Furthermore, any strategy to control inflation must also take into account their effects on economic output as this variable is also important to an economy’s well-being. Lastly, the flexibility and independence of central banks must also be present as empirical evidence shows us that independent central banks tend to perform better than their counterparts.
Exchange Rate Pegging
When a country’s exchange rate is fixed, its interest rate and inflation is determined by the monetary policy in the country to whose currency the exchange rate has been pegged (Stephen Cecchetti, 2006, page 569). Should the inflation levels of the country being used as the anchor currency is low, the inflation levels of the country using the exchange rate peg would slowly lower and run parallel to the anchor country. The argument in favor of the exchange rate peg seems weak even though this strategy forms a good and solid nominal anchor to solve the time inconsistency, transparency and accountability problem of the central bank. The major drawback to this strategy is that the central bank loses its independence in setting monetary policy and cannot be forward looking as they are forced to follow the monetary policy of the anchor country. This will cripple the central bank to respond to output fluctuations and disruptions that might seriously hamper economic growth. Furthermore, exchange rate pegs have a history of being successful only in the short run.
The United Kingdom before its adoption of inflation targeting used exchange rate targeting to a great success. In 1992, the United Kingdom managed to lower its inflation rate from 10% to 3% in the 1990s.[2] The ripple effects from the German Reunification in 1990 (the cost of rebuilding Eastern Germany) created inflationary pressures that forced the Bundesbank to raise interest rates. Because the British pound was pegged to the German mark, an interest parity condition occurred. The interest parity condition, states that the domestic interest rate equals the foreign interest rate minus the expected appreciation of the domestic currency (Mishkin, 2007 p.441). The rise in German interest rates meant that either England raises its interest rates or lets its currency depreciate.
Speculators like George Soros knew for certain that the British pound would depreciate (the British were facing a recession) and started short selling the pound (and purchasing the mark). Whatever the Bank of England lost, were the profits of speculators like George Soros who became known as the man who broke the Bank of England. Extreme commitments to exchange rate pegs seem to fare even worst. In April 1991, Argentina decided to use a currency board whereby 1 USD is redeemable for 1 Peso. During the early years, Argentina’s currency board outperformed any other inflation controlling strategy with inflation plunging from 800% to 5%[3] (Frederic Mishkin, 2007 p486). However, the currency board crippled Argentina’s control over monetary policy and was left at the mercy of economic output fluctuations (like those caused by the Mexican peso crisis). In 2002, the currency board collapsed and the peso depreciated more than 70% resulting in high inflation, a full scale financial crisis, and a severe depression.
The bottom line is exchange rate pegs might work extremely well in the short run but this will be at the expense of economic stability in the long run. The problem is which countries are able to apply it in question. Economically strong countries like the United States would be unable to find any other country’s currency to anchor to. Emerging countries like third world countries with high growth may pay dearly for sacrificing monetary policy independence over the short term gain of controlling inflation. Should a country decide to adopt it nonetheless, another question that arises is the commitment towards the exchange rate peg. Weak commitment would induce speculative attacks while strong commitments (like those of the currency board) may prove to be a long run monetary disaster. Furthermore, monetary policy of the anchor country might have adverse effects on the country practicing exchange rate pegs. And as we all know, central banks do make mistakes.
Monetary Targeting
Milton Friedman quoted that “inflation is always and everywhere a monetary phenomenon.”[4] Friedman suggested monetary targeting by adopting a constant-money-growth rate rule whereby the central bank would expand the money supply each year at the same annual rate as the typical growth of the economy’s production capacity.[5] The implementation of such a rule would eliminate the major cause of instability in the economy by providing liquidity that will cause aggregate demand and economic output to increase steadily. In reality however, no monetary targeting central bank has followed the rule laid down by Milton Friedman.
We will take Germany as the prime example of monetary targeting because the Bundesbank managed to achieve low inflation with its monetary targeting regime. One key aspect to be noted is that Germany’s monetary targeting regime did not follow Milton Friedman’s rule of a constant growth monetary aggregate. Ironically, the Bundesbank often misses its own monetary aggregate targets in favor of being flexible and responsive to any fluctuations in economic output and exchange rates. This decreases the credibility of the central bank as the public has lesser confidence that the monetary target would be reached.
From the example of Germany’s monetary targeting regime, we find that monetary targeting can achieve low inflation and with that price stability at the cost of occasional misses in its monetary aggregate targets. This strategy scores high for forward looking, independence, flexibility, and transparency but sacrifices accountability, and vulnerability to the time inconsistency problem (setting a target and not achieving it would not impress anybody). In terms of long run economic growth, the United States has abandoned this policy while Japan did not seem to be successful either and thereby hinting us that there are other more successful methods of gaining long run economic growth.
One of the major problems about monetary targeting is that it relies heavily on a strong relationship between monetary aggregates and inflation rates as shown in the diagram above (Link #2). A strong relationship between the two variables may not be guaranteed (like seen in the United States). Should this happen, the monetary aggregate target will be worthless as an indicator of the performance of the economy and the central bank.
Inflation Targeting
Inflation targeting has recently become very popular among central banks. Its various advantages (compared to other strategies) cannot be discounted. Inflation targeting makes a solid and firm commitment towards price stability which in one fell strike answers to price stability as a long-term goal, counters the time-inconsistency problem, and makes central banks both accountable and highly transparent. Some economists however argue that inflation targeting is too rigid and thereby limiting the ability of the central banks to be independent and forward looking.
Also taken into consideration is that inflation targeting might overemphasize the goal of price stability and may neglect economic output as another major goal of monetary policy. Much credit has however been given to inflation targeting as the ideal monetary policy strategy against inflation as countries adopting this strategy have achieved both lower inflation and higher real growth[i]. Countries that have adopted this strategy (United Kingdom, Canada, and New Zealand) are seen to achieve remarkable results in terms of controlling inflation.
However, do achieving inflation targets fulfill the long run goal of price stability? On paper this might look to be true as figures representing inflation like those of the Consumer Price Index (CPI) might show low inflation. However as I have mentioned in the literature review, inflation is present in consumer goods and services that we cannot possibly live without mainly fuel and food. Because the CPI is an average of all goods and services in a common household, other goods and services which are decreasing in price (we can live without a new TV or computer) and optional will distort the CPI. If this proves to be true, then achieving the inflation target might not mean price stability.
Just Do It
Alan Greenspan has become an oracle to many people in the world by achieving extraordinary economic results through adopting an implicit nominal anchor. Focusing on preemptive strikes (prevention is better than cure), the ‘just do it’ policy attempts to kill inflation expectation before it builds up enough momentum to cause inflationary pressures. The rationale of this is because monetary policy effects have long lags.[6] Because of this, monetary policy should be forward looking to be able to anticipate the effect of current actions upon the future economic situation.
The ‘just do it’ policy is proven to be forward looking, being able to achieve economic growth, and to be very flexible in conducting monetary policy to combat inflation. This is shown when the Federal Reserve of the United States responded by cutting the federal funds rate after the September 11 terrorist attacks and the adverse impact of the Enron Scandal (Frederic Mishkin, 2004, p.1). What is lacking in the ‘just do it’ policy is transparency, and accountability. Furthermore, Alan Greenspan has practically become the nominal anchor in the eyes of the public. After Alan Greenspan is no longer chairman of the Federal Reserve, there is no guarantee that the new person in office would continue to adhere to the dual mandate of price stability and output stability.
The Solution
Frederic Mishkin (1997) has enlightened us by introducing four common strategies central banks use to control inflation (and in some cases deflation). The exchange rate peg seems to sacrifice long term economic prosperity over short term gains on inflation. Monetary targeting on the other hand works when central banks (Bundesbank) miss their target (for the benefit of countering any adverse economic fluctuations) making the credibility and accountability of central banks low. Inflation targeting through highly successful may prove too rigid (overemphasis on inflation levels). Finally the ‘just do it’ policy depends too much on a certain individuals in charge of the central bank. Given the arguments on the advantages and disadvantages of the various strategies, one must come out with a framework on which strategy is most appropriate to be used by central banks across the globe.
Fortunately, Frederic Mishkin (2000) has come out with the criteria for what central banks should do. First, price stability should continue being the long-run goal of central banks as the benefits of achieving it is irreplaceable. Second, an explicit nominal anchor should be adopted as this can be used to solve the time-inconsistency problem and increase the accountability of central banks. Third, central banks should be goal independent and instrument independent so as to be able to react to adverse fluctuations in output, economic activities, and at the same time being able to conduct monetary policy without any disturbance of the short run needs of politicians.
Based on the requirements above, inflation targeting seems to be the best choice. However, inflation targeting may lack the flexibility needed to respond against adverse affects on economic output shocks (overemphasis on inflation). The solution to this is to adopt a hybrid of inflation targeting and the ‘just do it’ policy or forward looking inflation targeting. History has shown us that supply shocks and financial instability may build inflationary pressures.[ii] Central banks must therefore retain their flexibility and independence seen in the ‘just do it’ strategy to provide monetary policy that are countercyclical against adverse economic situations. On the other hand, central banks with an explicit nominal anchor will be more accountable and transparent towards the public thereby forcing the central banks to perform well and responsibly.
The arguments in support of this hybrid strategy are overwhelmingly strong. Central banks cannot sustain the permanent growth in economy and to achieve high employment by continuous expansionary monetary policy. The Philips curve that shows that higher inflation came with lower unemployment was only in the short run with Milton Friedman (1976) pointing out that this trade-off was only temporary. On the other hand, high inflation and high unemployment the phenomenon of stagflation is dangerously possible and must be avoided by central banks at all cost. Central banks across the world must understand that we cannot spend our way into continuous economic growth at the price of high inflation. As Milton Friedman once said, “there is no such thing as a free lunch.”
Conclusion
The Great Inflation of the late 1970s gave way to an age of low, and steady inflation thanks in part to the skill with which central banks learnt to steer monetary policy.[7] The current age of low and steady inflation in industrialized countries might not last forever.[iii] Exchange rate imbalances (like those of the USD being overvalued and the Yuan being undervalued) coupled with financial globalization has killed inflationary pressures by providing first world countries with cheap imports and labor from third world countries. As foreign direct investments continue to flow into China and India[iv] (creating inflationary pressures there), it is only a matter of time when this ‘happy hour’ comes to an end. Furthermore, the shrinking middle class and low birth rates of industrialized countries might lead to a death loop by people spending more than they earn, borrowing more than they can afford and governments indirectly printing more money to solve budget deficits.[8] In an age that Alan Greenspan coined as the ‘Age of Turbulence’, economists must never underestimate the destructive power of high inflation.
Money Matters – How Much Money Do We Need When We Retire
Assuming that inflation in Malaysia is 3.5%, one must have total cash of around Rm1 million to maintain one’s current lifestyle for 20 years after retirement. Quite alarming….
|
Financial Requirements at retirement age of 55 |
||||
|
Money required per month to maintain lifestyle (Rm) |
Minimum achievable annual target return |
|||
|
3% |
5% |
7% |
10% |
|
|
3,000 |
1,579,599 |
1,307,635 |
1,100,691 |
874,884 |
|
5,000 |
2,632,664 |
2,179,391 |
1,834,484 |
1,458,139 |
|
7,000 |
3,685,730 |
3,051,148 |
2,568,278 |
2,041,395 |
|
10,000 |
5,265,329 |
4,358,783 |
3,668,969 |
2,916,279 |
References
- Ø Campbell R. Mc Connell & Stanley L. Brue. 2008. “Economics.” Mc Graw Hill. p.134.
- Ø Donald J. Trump & Robert T. Kiyosaki. 2006. “Why We Want You To Be Rich.” Rich Press, Rich Publishing. p.75-76.
- Ø Frederic S. Mishkin. 1997. “Strategies For Contolling Inflation.” National Bureau of Economic Research. p.1-32.
- Ø Frederic S. Mishkin. 2000. “What Should Central Banks Do?” National Bureau of Economic Research. p.1-5, 6-8, 11-14, 16-17, 19.
- Ø Frederic S. Mishkin. 2004. “Why The Federal Reserve Should Adopt Inflation Targeting.” National Bureau of Economic Research & Columbia University. p.1, 4-6.
- Ø Frederic S. Mishkin. 2007. “The Economics of Money, Banking, and Financial Markets.” Pearson Education Inc. p.613-637, 52.
- Ø Gary B. Nash & Julie Roy Jeffrey. 1990. “The American People-Volume 2.” Harper Collins. p.971-976.
- Ø Gary B. Shelly, Thomas J. Cashman, Misty E. Vermaat. 2005. “Discovering Computers.” Thomson Learning. p.193, 219.
- Ø Mark Kishlansky, Patrick Geary, & Patricia O’Brien. 1995. “Civilization of the West.” Harper Collins. p.852-854, 871-872, 944.
- Ø Milton Friedman. 1977. “Nobel Lecture: Inflation and Unemployment.” Journal of Political Economy. p.270, 272, 280.
- Ø Stephen G. Cecchetti. 2006. “Money, Banking, and Financial Markets.” Mc Graw Hill. p.7, 24, 519.
- Ø Barrett Sheridan. 2007. “Heady Days.” Newsweek: http://www.newsweek.com/id/78027 Access: 15 December 2007, 3.00 PM
- Ø Christopher Dickey. 2007. “Let Them Eat Cake.” Newsweek: http://www.newsweek.com/id/78115 Access: 13 December 2007, 5.00 PM
- Ø Fred Kaifosh. “The Consumer Price Index Controversy.” Obtained at: http://www.investopedia.com/articles/07/consumerpriceindex.aspAccess: 20 December 2007, 7.00 PM
- Ø Ruchir Sharma. 2007. “Stand Clear of the Closing Doors.” Newsweek: http://www.newsweek.com/id/81565 Access: 25 December 2007, 5.55 PM
- Ø The Economist. October 20th-26th 2007. “Only Human.” p.3-4.
- Ø The Economist. October 20th-26th 2007. “Heroes of the Zeroes.” p.8-12.
- Ø The Economist. June 30th-July 6th 2007. “Food.” p.101.
- Ø The Economist. March 5th-11th 2007. “The Insidious Charms of Foreign Investment.” p.9-13.
- Ø The Economist. February 26th-March 4th 2007. “Are central banks watching the wrong measure of inflation?.” p.72.
- Ø The Economist. October 20th-26th 2007. “Only Human.” p.3-4.
- Ø Newsweek. September 24, 2007. “The Greenspan Gospel.” p.17-21.
- Ø Newsweek. September 24, 2007. “The Oracle Reveals All.” p.22-
- Ø 23.
[1] Frederic S. Mishkin, 2000, What Should Central Banks Do? National Bureau of Economic Research.
[2] Frederic S. Mishkin, 2007
[3] Frederic S. Mishkin, 2007
[4] Frederic Mishkin, 2007, p.613
[5] Campbell McConnell & Stanley Brue, 2008, p.330
[6] Milton Friedman, 1976, p.271
[7] The Economist, A Special Report on Central Banks and World Economy, Only Human, October 20th-26th, p.4
[8] Donald J. Trump & Robert T. Kiyosaki, Why We Want You to be Rich, 2006
matt said
This blog’s great!! Thanks :).
jamesesz said
Thanks for your support!
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